State ex rel. Catherine Hanaway v. Hellman, No. SC101132 (Mo. banc Jan. 13, 2026).
Issue:
Whether § 577.023.2 RSMo. (2016) is facially unconstitutional, such that Defendant could not be sentenced as a persistent DWI offender without violating his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Facts:
Johnson was alleged to have operated a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs in Franklin County, Missouri. Among the charges brought against him was that he committed a class E felony as a persistent offender, having previously been convicted of DWI and on prior, separate occasions. Johnson successfully moved to dismiss the felony DWI charge on the grounds that Erlinger v. U.S., 602 U.S. 821 (2024) requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the prior convictions had occurred on different occasions in order to sentence him as a persistent offender, and (2) § 577.023,2 RSMo., by which the trial court, not the jury, finds the violations occurred on “separate occasions,” facially violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
The State sought a writ of prohibition from the Court of Appeals, asking the court to compel the trial court to set aside its order of dismissal of the felony charge. The appeals court denied the writ, but the Missouri Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition, which the State sought to make permanent.
Analysis:
The Court noted that, in its de novo review, it presumed the statute to be valid, and the proponent bears the burden of showing the statute “clearly contravenes a constitutional provision.” If the State can show any set of circumstances under which the statute is constitutional, the proponent’s challenge fails. Salamun v. Camden Cnty. Clerk, 694 S.W.3d 424 (Mo. banc 2024); U.S. v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).
The Court then found, as the State conceded, that, pursuant to Erlinger, Johnson was entitled to have the jury determine whether his prior IRTOs (Intoxication-Related Traffic Offenses) were committed on separate occasions. However, the Court rejected Johnson’s argument that the finding of separate occasions made by the trial court prior to submission of the case to the jury rendered the statute facially unconstitutional. The Court articulated a scenario where “[i]f, after the circuit court has made its pre-submission finding Johnson is a persistent offender, the jury makes the same finding, unanimously and beyond reasonable doubt, Johnson’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights remain inviolate.”
The Court also found that the rules of procedure already in place, particularly “second-stage proceedings,” ensure protection of a defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Complying with a procedure whereby (1) the circuit court allows the jury to determine the issue of guilt, (2) upon a guilty verdict, the parties submit additional sentencing enhancing facts to the jury through jury instructions to determine if the defendant is a persistent offender, and (3) the jury finds the required facts, the defendant may be sentenced as a persistent offender, and would secure Johnson’s constitutional rights.
The Court made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition.
State of Missouri v. Jones, No. SC101104 (Mo. banc Dec. 29, 2025).
Issue:
Whether the Supreme Court should provide plain error review under the circumstances of the case, where there was a variance between the charged offense and a charging instruction given to the jury.
Facts:
While an individual referenced as “D.W.” and another designated as “Victim” were together at Victim’s apartment, D.W. received multiple phone calls from Defendant-Appellant Jones over the course of about 20 minutes. Victim could hear Jones yelling at D.W. during the calls. Seeing that D.W. was becoming upset by the calls, Victim offered to drop D.W. off at D.W.’s aunt’s house. While Victim drove D.W. to the aunt’s house, Jones repeatedly called D.W. and the two argued over the phone. As they neared their destination, Victim heard a gunshot and stopped her car. While the car was stopped, Jones ran up to the driver’s side window with a gun in her hand and began hitting the window with it. D.W. got out of the vehicle and had a physical altercation with Jones. In the meantime, Victim drove away. As she fled, Victim heard a second gunshot. Away from the scene, she flagged down police. The police observed a bullet hole in Victim’s vehicle and told Victim to make a report at the police station. At the station, Victim identified Jones as the shooter.
One of the two counts with which Jones was charged was unlawful use of a weapon with a firearm, as follows: “The defendant … committed the class B felony of unlawful use of a weapon…in that on or about February 4, 2020, in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant, knowingly discharged a firearm at a 2014 Ford Focus, a motor vehicle.”
At the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed in part, as follows: “Jury Instruction No. 9: [I]f you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: That on or about February 4, 2020, in the State of Missouri, the defendant knowingly discharged a firearm into a motor vehicle 2014 Ford Focus, then you will find the defendant guilty . . . of unlawful use of a weapon. However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense.” No objection was made to submission of the instruction.
On appeal, Jones claimed the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict and entering judgment of conviction and sentence for the Class B felony of unlawful use of a weapon in that the jury found her guilty of an offense different and distinct from the charged offense, in view of the jury instructions. She also argued that the accompanying guilty verdict for armed criminal action should be vacated unless she was found guilty of the underlying class B felony unlawful use of a weapon offense for which she was charged.
Analysis:
Jones conceded that her claim was not properly preserved for appeal and requested the appellate court to review her claim for plain error. While noting that appellate courts generally do not review unpreserved claims of error, the appellate court recognized that Rule 30.20 allows appellate courts to review specified unpreserved claims of error in criminal proceedings. State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Mo. banc 2020). Rule 30.20 sets forth the limitations for appellate courts to consider unpreserved allegations of error.
The appellate court stated that its review, if any, lay under the second sentence of Rule 30.20, and as such the questions on appeal were: (1) whether the circuit court committed “plain error affecting substantial rights; (2) whether “manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice” resulted, and (3) whether the Court in its discretion should review Jones’s claim.
Following a lengthy discussion of the case law underlying the plain error doctrine in the Rule 30.20 context, the court stated that, when “confronted” with a request to grant relief applying plain error review, it could resolve the claim in one of five ways under the Rule 30.20 framework: (1) Declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error, i.e., evident, obvious and clear error; (2) Declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish substantial grounds that the circuit court committed an error affecting substantial rights; (3) Declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish substantial grounds that any alleged error the circuit court committed resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice; (4) Declining to exercise its discretionary authority to review for plain error; or (5) Determining an appellant facially established substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error affecting substantial rights resulting in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice, warranting exercise of the appellate court’s discretion to review and grant relief.
The opinion in footnote 5 stated in part that “[W]hile Rule 30.20 provides appellate courts with the discretion to determine whether certain claims should be reviewed for plain error, exercising this discretion is not without limits… Thus, while an appellate court retains the discretion to review a claim for plain error, this authority must not be abused.”
Against this backdrop, the appellate court found that the trial court did err in submitting Instruction No. 9, but found that there was not “evident, obvious, clear error” because “the prepositions ‘at’ and ‘into’ are related.” That is, “[t]o shoot ‘into’ something, one must also necessarily shoot ‘at’ that same thing.” Further, “[I]n reaching its verdict the jury could not have found Jones shot ‘into’ the vehicle without shooting ‘at’ that same vehicle.”
The appellate court thus found that Jones had failed to facially establish substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error accepting the jury’s verdict, entering judgment, and imposing a sentence for the class B felony of unlawful use of a weapon, despite the variance between the charged offense and Instruction No. 9. Therefore, the appellate court declined Jones’s request for plain error review, and no further analysis under the Rule 30.20 plain error framework was necessary.
Spalding, et al. v. Martin, et al., No. ED113426 (Mo. App. Dec. 30, 2025)
Issue:
Whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s judgment granting a motion to enforce settlement and dismissing the subject lawsuit against Defendants.
Facts:
Plaintiffs and Defendant Martin are sisters. Following their father’s death, Plaintiffs questioned Martin’s use of funds from a trust established by their parents. The trust designated all 4 sisters as beneficiaries, and plaintiff Spalding and defendant Martin as trustees.
Martin then admitted in an e-mail that she improperly took funds from the trust, amounting to $64,059.81. A year and a half of e-mails ensued, disputing the amount. Martin continued to propose that the above amount was what was owed, and eventually Spalding replied stating “We would each prefer three cashiers [sic] checks each in the amount of $21,353.27 made payable to: Deborah Thelen, Cynthia Parazak and Karen Spaulding. We can meet you on Thursday August 3rd at the bank parking lot or if you prefer you can drop them in my mailbox and contact me when you do. Our times we are available are 8:30-9:00 or 1:00-3:30.”
Martin deposited the three cashiers’ checks in the requested amount in Spalding’s mailbox on August 3 at 9:55 a.m., a note to each Plaintiff appeared on the checks, stating “By receiving this Cashier Check in the amount of $21,353.27, it is agreed that there will be no further claims against Kimberly A. Martin and/or Gary T. Martin. This will settle the Estate of Robert C. and Dorothy J. Nesbit.” The checks also contained a notation, stating “FINAL SETTLEMENT-FULL RELEASE NESBIT TRUST (NOTE ATTACHED).”
Plaintiffs neither rejected nor deposited the funds, nor did they return the checks. Instead, six weeks later Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants (Martin and her husband) asserting conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages. Defendants then filed a motion to enforce settlement, asserting that the claims were voluntarily settled on terms they proposed, with aid of an attorney. Plaintiffs did not appear at an evidentiary hearing on the matter, and the case was submitted on the affidavits of both parties. The trial court granted the motion to enforce and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.
Standard of Review:
As a motion to enforce settlement, the standard of review is that of a court-tried case. The trial court’s judgment is to be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, is not against the weight of the evidence, or does not erroneously declare or apply the law. A challenge on substantial evidence grounds is considered by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. All evidence and inferences favorable to the judgment are accepted as true, and no contrary evidence need be considered, regardless of the burden of proof.
Analysis:
Enforcement of a settlement agreement may be raised as an affirmative defense or in a motion to enforce. The burden of proof falls on the moving party to show the existence of an agreement by “clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.” Settlement agreements are governed by contract law, and movants must show the essential elements of a contract: offer, acceptance, and consideration. The trial court looks to the objective expressions of the parties (i.e., not intentions or suppositions), to determine whether a meeting of the minds occurred. Matthes v. Wynkoop, 435 S.W.3d 100 (Mo. App. 2014).
The appellate court found that the Defendants’ affidavits and the numerous e-mails between the sides constituted sufficient evidence for the lower court to find by clear and convincing evidence there was a valid settlement agreement. This evidence included (1) Plaintiffs’ admission via affidavit that the negotiations had been an “attempt to settle the matter”; (2) Plaintiffs’ stated desire to “close this chapter of our lives”; (3) Martin’s statement that payment of $64,059.81 put them “in a position to clear this matter” and later statement that Defendants were prepared to disburse the amount “as you see fit”; (4) Plaintiffs’ acceptance of the offer and specifically setting forth the terms of acceptance as requiring three separate cashier’s checks in equal amounts, as well as asking for payment in one of two specific fashions and identifying specific times for delivery; (5) further communications on the day of check delivery as to the when and where, with Martin stating “We have your checks,” and Spalding replying “This morning is good. Drop them to mailbox and please let me know you have delivered them;” and (6) Martin emailing Spalding to inform her the checks had been delivered to her mailbox at 9:33 a.m. on August 3.
Thus, “[t]he email exchange and actions of the parties provided clear and convincing evidence of an offer by Defendants, acceptance by Plaintiffs, adherence to terms of the acceptance set forth by Plaintiffs, and consideration.” The appellate court cited Sw. Parts Supply, Inc. v. Winterer, 360 S.W. 3d 349, 354 (Mo. App. 2012) (email acceptance assented to terms of the offer); and St. Louis Union Station Holdings, Inc. v. Discovery Channel Store, Inc., 301 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Mo. App. 2009) (email exchange constituted clear and convincing evidence of offer and acceptance).
The trial court’s ruling enforcing settlement and entering dismissal against Plaintiffs was affirmed.
Niffen, et al. v. Feinstein, et al., No. ED 113227, (Mo. App. Jan. 13, 2026).
Issue:
Whether the subject amended judgment was conditional and therefore not final.
Facts:
Appellants Feinstein, et al., appealed from a trial court’s amended judgment ordering co-defendant Mark Fischer to convey to Respondent Niffens a 50-foot-wide road and utility easement over the Feinsteins’ property.
Fischer owned ten acres of land in St. Charles County, subdivided into Tracts 1, 2 and 3. He sold Tract 1 to the Niffens, with the general warranty deed including an easement along the western boundary of Tract 3, providing Tract 1 access to a nearby public road. The Niffens later entered a contract of deed to purchase Tract 2 from Fischer, which included an easement along the eastern boundary of Tract 3, connecting Tract 2 directly to the public road.
Tract 3 was later conveyed to Stephanie and Geoffrey Cisco, the deed stating that the tract was subject to the two easements. However, Fischer and the Ciscos later purportedly agreed to terminate the eastern easement; the same month, the Ciscos conveyed Tract 3 to the Feinsteins. The deed, however, did not reference either easement. The Feinsteins later constructed a home and pool on Tract 3, portions of which encroached on the eastern easement.
The Niffens filed a declaratory judgment action, stating that they did not consent to that arrangement and seeking a declaration that the purported termination of the eastern easement was null and void. They prevailed and judgment was entered in their favor following a bench trial. However, upon the motion of Fischer and the Ciscos, the trial court entered an amended judgment, as follows: “Once the Niffens fulfill their obligations under the Contract for Deed, Fischer shall be obligated to convey to them Tract 2 together with a 50 foot wide non-exclusive road and utility easement running along Tract 3, along that Tract’s Eastern border, and allowing Tract 2 direct access to Orf Road….”
Analysis:
The appellate court stated that it was required to sua sponte determine whether it had authority to reach the merits of the appeal, citing Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Mo. banc 2020). It would not have such authority if the trial court has not entered a final judgment; moreover, conditional judgments (those conditioned on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of future acts outside the record) are not final for purposes of appeal. City of Portage Des Sioux v. Lambert, 323 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Mo. App. 2010).
The appellate court went on to find that the amended judgment is “clearly conditional: it requires Fischer to convey Tract 2 and the eastern easement to the Niffens only if they first fulfill their obligations under the contract for deed.” Because the court could not determine from the record on appeal whether the Niffens had done so, it lacked authority to entertain the appeal and dismissed it.
State of Missouri v. Rivers, No. ED113150, (Mo. App. Dec. 30, 2025).
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in denying Rivers’s motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial on the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon because the State’s evidence was insufficient.
Facts:
Rivers and others were occupying a vehicle at a Cape Girardeau County Park South parking lot before midnight on February 22, 2023. After being approached by the police, the parties were instructed to exit their vehicle, were patted down, and were informed they were under arrest for a curfew violation. Rivers then fled the scene, after which the officers discovered in plain sight a firearm in the car, in close proximity to where Rivers had been seated. Rivers was arrested and charged with two offenses: unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and resisting lawful detention.
Rivers’s flight became a significant factual component in the State’s case because there was no evidence he was on probation or otherwise under supervision that might have offered an alternative explanation for running from police. The absence of such evidence allowed the factfinder to infer that his flight related to consciousness of guilt—specifically, guilt concerning the unlawful possession of the firearm.
At trial, the State relied on the combination of the firearm’s accessibility, its visibility, and Rivers’s flight to establish knowing possession. The court convicted Rivers on both counts. Rivers then filed post‑trial motions, including a motion for judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial, arguing insufficiency of the evidence as to possession. Both were denied, and he appealed.
Analysis:
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, applied the standard of review governing challenges to sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases. Under that standard, the appellate court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the State, defers to the factfinder on issues of witness credibility and reasonable inferences, and determines only whether there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the defendant committed the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
To prove unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, the State must demonstrate (1) the defendant had a prior felony conviction and (2) knowingly possessed a firearm. Because actual physical possession is not required, Missouri courts have long recognized constructive possession—where a defendant has the ability and intent to exercise control over the weapon—as sufficient.
Here, the Court emphasized three key evidentiary points:
Visibility of the firearm – Its presence in open view supported an inference that Rivers was aware of it.
Ease of access – The weapon’s proximity to where Rivers had been seated in the vehicle allowed a factfinder to conclude Rivers had the ability to exercise control over it.
Flight from police – Because the record contained no evidence that Rivers was on probation or had another benign reason to flee, the factfinder could reasonably treat his flight as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt related specifically to the firearm.
The appellate court concluded that, when these factors were considered together, they provided a legally sufficient basis for the trial court’s determination that Rivers knowingly possessed the firearm. The court did not consider the issue of whether Rivers’s flight standing alone was sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment.
State of Missouri v. Barrera, No. SC101178, (Mo. banc Dec. 29, 2025).
Issue:
Whether the circuit court erred in suppressing urine‑test evidence obtained from Israel Barrera pursuant to two search warrants.
Facts:
On July 12, 2021, the Cass County Sheriff’s Office received a report that Barrera had repeatedly molested a 14‑year‑old girl over several years. A medical examination at Children’s Mercy Hospital revealed the child had contracted a sexually transmitted disease, and the victim denied having any consensual sexual partners.
Police initially obtained a warrant on September 1, 2021, authorizing the seizure of a urine sample and buccal swab from Barrera. That sample was later deemed improperly preserved and unusable. On September 14, 2021, a detective applied for two new warrants: warrant 1 (to seize a new urine sample) and warrant 2 (to test the sample). Both affidavits repeated the same factual basis—namely, the molestation report, the victim’s positive STD test, and the victim’s statement denying consensual sexual activity.
The judge issued both warrants, and Barrera’s new urine sample tested positive for the STD. During pretrial proceedings, Barrera moved to quash both warrants and to suppress the test results. The circuit court determined warrant 1 did not establish probable cause and further held that the good‑faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the affidavit was too deficient for a reasonable officer to rely on. It also ruled warrant 2 unnecessary, concluding that warrant 1 already authorized both seizure and testing under State v. Swartz, 517 S.W.3d 40 (Mo. App. 2017). The State filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to § 547.200.1 RSMo. (2016).
Analysis:
The Missouri Supreme Court applied the totality‑of‑the‑circumstances test for probable cause, emphasizing the deference owed to issuing judges. The Court rejected the circuit court’s conclusion that the hearsay report of molestation lacked adequate indicia of reliability. While the affidavit did not provide granular details about the source of the report or the mechanics of STD transmission, those omissions were not fatal. Under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), hearsay may be credited if corroborated by independent investigative information.
Here, the corroboration was substantial: medical professionals confirmed the victim had an STD, and she denied having consensual partners. These independently verified facts substantiated the molestation allegation and, by extension, supported the inference that Barrera—identified as the molester—likely carried the same STD. Given that the goal of the warrant was to check for the presence of the STD in Barrera's urine, the Court found a fair probability that evidence would be discovered. The affidavit therefore provided a substantial basis for the issuing judge’s decision.
The Court also criticized the limited detail in the detective’s affidavit but concluded this was a marginal case where the constitutional preference for warrants justified deference. Because warrant 1 alone was sufficient to authorize both seizure and testing, the challenges related to warrant 2 were moot. The Court reversed the suppression ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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