Published by Grand Central - 534 Pages, $30

I admit it: I am a Scott Turow fan. As a first-year law student, I happened to be in law school the year after Turow’s memoir One L was published. While the University of Missouri–Kansas City School of Law was not Harvard Law School, many of the experiences he described felt familiar. Over the years, I have read most of Turow’s novels and enjoyed each one. His latest, Presumed Guilty, continues that tradition.

Turow reunites readers with Rusty Sabich, the protagonist of his landmark 1987 novel Presumed Innocent. Nearly forty years after being acquitted of murdering his mistress, Rusty is living quietly in the Midwest with his longtime partner, Bea. Also living with them is Bea’s adopted son, Aaron, a young man struggling to rebuild his life while on probation for drug possession.

When Aaron suddenly disappears, concern quickly turns to crisis. If he fails to report to his probation officer, he faces a return to jail. Aaron eventually reappears with a vague story involving a camping trip and an argument with his troubled girlfriend, Mae. When Mae fails to return and is later found dead, Aaron becomes the prime suspect and is charged with first-degree murder.

Faced with few options, Bea implores Rusty to return to the courtroom one last time to defend her son. For Rusty, the central question is not merely whether Aaron is innocent, but whether a justice system to which he has devoted his life can truly deliver justice to someone who is already presumed guilty.

Over the course of Turow’s novels, Rusty has served as prosecutor, judge, and now defense attorney. In Presumed Guilty, he brings all of those experiences to bear as he represents Aaron. In classic Turow fashion, law and politics intersect throughout the investigation and trial, each influencing the search for truth and the administration of justice.

The novel also devotes significant attention to Rusty’s personal life. Long-buried secrets emerge, loyalties are tested, and relationships are strained. Rusty has evolved considerably since readers first met him decades ago. He remains imperfect, but age and experience have given him greater compassion and empathy, qualities that shape his defense of Aaron and make him a more accessible and relatable protagonist.

The murder case itself may not be as intricate as some of Rusty’s earlier legal battles, but it remains compelling throughout. Turow’s courtroom scenes are, as always, authentic and engrossing. While experienced lawyers may occasionally encounter explanations of legal procedures they already know, these moments are brief and do little to interrupt the narrative’s momentum.

The novel explores a range of contemporary issues, including addiction, racial bias, discrimination, infidelity, and complex family dynamics. Turow skillfully balances the legal thriller elements with the interpersonal relationships that drive the story. The mystery unfolds through Rusty’s first-person perspective, with enough twists, red herrings, and surprises to keep readers engaged until the end.

One of the book’s strengths is its cast of flawed and believable characters. Aaron, a recovering addict with a criminal record, is far from perfect, yet Turow makes it easy for readers to sympathize with him and question whether he is being judged more for who he has been than for what he may have done. Bea’s complicated relationship with her father, Joe—a former alcoholic and abusive parent who has become a devoted grandfather—adds further emotional depth to the story.

The trial takes place in a predominantly white community where Mae’s body was discovered, raising difficult questions about race and perception. Aaron, who is African American and was adopted at birth by Bea and her late husband, faces challenges that extend well beyond the evidence presented in court. Turow handles these issues thoughtfully, allowing them to enrich the story without overwhelming it.

As the trial unfolds, Rusty squares off against an ambitious prosecutor while aided by a talented investigator whose discoveries repeatedly challenge the prosecution’s case. The judge, refreshingly, is portrayed as fair and even-handed rather than as an obstacle or caricature. 

At more than 500 pages, Presumed Guilty may appear intimidating, but readers should not be deterred. Turow provides enough background on Rusty and the supporting characters that newcomers can easily follow the story, while longtime fans will appreciate revisiting one of legal fiction’s most enduring protagonists.

For lawyers, judges, and anyone who enjoys a well-crafted legal thriller, Presumed Guilty is a rewarding read. Turow once again demonstrates why he remains one of the finest writers in the genre. While the verdict may not come as a complete surprise, the novel’s final resolution is both satisfying and memorable—one of Turow’s best endings in years.

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Missouri State Conference vs. Governor Mike Kehoe, et al., No. SC101541 (Mo. banc May 27, 2026). 

Summary:

The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s declaratory judgment that the Missouri governor has constitutional authority to call an extraordinary session to address issues relating to, first, establishing new congressional districts and, second, changing the initiative petition process. 

The NAACP and two individuals (collectively “NAACP”) sued seeking a declaration that the governor’s proclamation did not meet the requirements of article IV, section 9 of the Missouri Constitution, as the circumstances did not constitute an “extraordinary occasion.”  Further, they sought to enjoin the session and, ultimately, implementation of the measures enacted there. Following a bench trial, a Cole County circuit court judge found that constitutional authority existed to call the session, and that the question was political in nature, properly decidable by the governor.  

In affirming the circuit court opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court held that article IV, section 9 gave the governor discretion to determine whether an extraordinary occasion exists, warranting calling an extraordinary session.

Facts: 

In August 2025, the governor issued a proclamation calling for the Second Extraordinary Session of the 103^rd Missouri General Assembly, articulating an “extraordinary occasion” requiring two actions:  establishing new congressional districts and changing the initiative petition process. Among the stated reasons for this action were that the General Assembly had adjourned its regular legislative session without having enacted new congressional district boundaries; that Missouri’s current congressional map could be vulnerable to a legal challenge under the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment; that “our congressional delegation should reflect the values of Missourians;” that legislation to establish new congressional districts could not be accomplished in the 2016 Regular Session; and that “swift and efficient resolution of the matter is necessary to prepare for the upcoming election cycle and to provide certainty for voters.”

As to the initiative process, the governor proclaimed that “a fair and transparent initiative process is essential for the citizens of Missouri to propose and enact laws;” that the current initiative process “may be vulnerable to foreign and out-of-state influence;” and that “certain ballot initiatives can be confusing to voters and lead to unintended consequences.”

The General Assembly then met and passed House Bill 1 and House Joint Resolution 3, adopting a new congressional district map and proposing a constitutional amendment altering the initiative petition process.  

NAACP filed suit on the day the extraordinary session was to convene, seeking a declaration that the governor’s proclamation failed to state an extraordinary occasion pursuant to article IV, section 9 and requesting injunctive relief against convening the general assembly. The NAACP later amended its pleadings, requesting the court to enjoin implementation of the legislation passed during the extraordinary session which had occurred while the initial injunction request was pending.

Reasoning:  

In affirming that the governor had constitutional authority to call the extraordinary session and that the issue raised by the NAACP was a political question that should be determined by the governor, the Supreme Court found that neither constitutional text nor historical context impose limitation of the governor’s discretion according to an objective definition of “extraordinary.” The Court emphasized language of article IV, section 9 that the governor may give to the general assembly information as to state of the government and recommend to it such measures “as he shall deem necessary and expedient.” Further, per section 9 the governor may convene the general assembly by proclamation on “extraordinary occasions,” stating specifically each matter on which action is “deemed necessary.” Per the Court, this language instills the governor with a “great deal of discretion.”

The Supreme Court rejected the NAACP’s argument that the dictionary definition of “extraordinary” (in context “an unusual set of circumstances”) must exist before the governor may exercise the discretion to identify the measures to be considered within an extraordinary session. The NAACP further argued that the events identified in the proclamation already existed at the time of the prior session of the general assembly, so no “extraordinary occasion” existed allowing the governor to call an extraordinary session.

The Court stated that the plain meaning of “extraordinary” in the constitutional provision, from the time of its adoption (1820) through the present, is “a particular occasion, outside the regular or ordinary pattern of legislative sessions, and called by the governor to address issues he deems necessary.” (Citing “Extraordinary,” Noah Webster’s Am Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). 

The Court stated that, contrary to NAACP’s contention, article IV, section 9 does not include language suggesting the governor’s discretion to call an extraordinary purpose “is limited in any way.” Citing McGivney v.  Mo. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 653 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Mo. banc 2022), the Court asserted that it would not read words into a constitutional provision, and that the constitutional provision does not require the extraordinary occasion to be an unusual occasion, nor does it specify a method for determining whether an occasion is sufficiently unusual to justify such a session.

Further, to hold that an extraordinary session must be called pursuant only to events that did not exist prior to the regular session would require the Court ignore the context of the entire provision, which also empowers  the governor to “inform the general assembly about the ‘state of the government’” and to suggest legislation in the context of calling  an extraordinary session.

Conclusion:  

The Supreme Court concluded that, given the discretion afforded by article IV, section 9, the governor acted pursuant to constitutional authority when calling the Second Extraordinary Session of the 103rd Missouri General Assembly.

Healey, et al. v. State, of Missouri, et al., SC101570, SC101572 (Mo. banc May 12, 2026)

Summary:  

In separate suits, two groups of residents challenged the constitutionality of the new congressional redistricting map enacted in 2025 with respect to the Kansas City, Missouri, area. The circuit court (Jackson County) consolidated the cases and considered substantial evidence regarding county and municipal splits, measures of compactness, and sundry expert and lay testimony, and concluded that the 2025 map did not violate constitutional standards.  

The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower court judgment, concluding that plaintiffs failed to show a clear, undoubtable violation of article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution and emphasized that statistical and historical comparisons supported the circuit court’s findings. It also found that any departures from compactness were minimal.

Facts:   

After the United States census was conducted in 2022, the Missouri legislature divided the state into congressional districts as required by article III, section 45, resulting in the 2022 Map.  However, in 2025 the legislature passed House Bill 1, repealing the 2022 Map and creating a redrawn congressional district map which the governor signed.

The Missouri Constitution directly addresses congressional redistricting in article II, section 45. In part, it instructs the legislature to “divide the state into districts corresponding with the number of representatives to which it is entitled, which districts shall be comprised of contiguous territory as compact and as nearly equal in population as may be.”

One group of appellants – the “Wise Appellants” – challenged districts as drawn in the 2025 Map as not being compact, not composing separate congressional districts to be of nearly equal population, and (with respect to two districts) not being contiguous. The second appellant group –– the “Healey Appellants” –– urged violation of the compactness requirement. The Missouri Republican State Committee was permitted to intervene in both cases.

As to compactness, the parties introduced recognized statistical measures to quantify compactness of the congressional districts created by the 2025 Map. Under the “Polsby-Popper” measure, experts for both sides agreed that the 2025 map was more compact state-wide than the 2022 map. The circuit court reached the same conclusion, using Maptitude mapping and redistricting software. The circuit court also found that the 2025 map outperformed the 2012 congressional map in terms of compactness. Other compactness measures supported these conclusions as well, according to the Court.

The parties also presented evidence and testimony from lay and expert witnesses related to “communities of interest” and alternative maps. Kansas City’s mayor testified to his concern with the 2025 map as dividing communities of interest in that city. While recognizing that Appellants’ policy preferences were “justifiable and understandable,” the Court determined that those preferences “have limited value” because “the court’s role is not to decide which portions of the Kansas City area are best to split to keep some ‘communities of interest’ intact while dividing others.”

Appellants also presented alternative maps at trial, which were not before nor considered by the legislature in passing the 2025 map. The circuit court concluded the maps “did little to aid the court’s evaluation of the 2025 map.”

As to contiguity and equal population requirements, the circuit court found that the Wise Appellants had put on no evidence at trial that actually supported the claims.  

Reasoning:

The Court stated that its review was “limited to determining only the legality—not the prudence or popularity—of the map.” Further, the 2025 map would be upheld unless it “plainly and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution” with doubts “resolved in favor of ... constitutionality….” Compactness and numerical equality “cannot be achieved with absolute precision….”

The Supreme Court emphasized that courts “will respect the political determinations of the Missouri legislature” where the redistricted map complies with constitutional strictures. Thus, drawing maps establishing congressional districts is a “political process, involving policy decisions that are political in nature, best left to elected representatives and the citizens of this state, not judges.” While gerrymandering may “reasonably seem unjust,” it involves “political questions” beyond the scope of judicial review absent laws prohibiting such practice.  

As to compactness, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Appellants introduced and relied on statistical metrics in arguing that certain districts were not compact. However, it stated that Appellants were wrong in contending that the circuit court relied solely on statistical metrics in determining compactness. Rather, the lower court considered the totality of the evidence, including historical maps, population density, county and municipal splits, and related expert testimony.  

The Court further rejected Appellants’ arguments that (a) the circuit court erred by failing to conduct a district-by-district analysis in determining compactness; (b) the circuit court’s evaluation was irrelevant, noting instead that the compactness of one district directly affects the compactness of a neighboring district; (c) it was erroneous to compare the compactness metrics of the 2025 map with the districts in prior congressional maps, because the constitutional requirements for redistricting implicitly permit consideration of the historical boundary lines of prior redistricting maps (citing Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 28 (Mo. banc 2012)); (d) the circuit court failed to consider “communities of interest” evidence, when in fact it did; (e) failing to determine whether the challenged districts’ departures from compactness were minimal and practical deviations, stating that the Appellants’ failure to demonstrate any departures from compactness obviated the need to make any such determination; and rejecting  of
Appellants’ arguments.

As to contiguity and equal protection requirements, as presaged above the Supreme Court disagreed with the contention that the circuit court misapplied the law in finding that no evidence had been presented by the Wise Appellants at trial to support their position on those issues. The Court relied on the presumption that the map was constitutional absent clear and undoubted proof that the map contravenes the constitution, with doubts resolved in favor of constitutionality.  

Conclusion:  

The Healey and Wise Appellants failed to show that the 2025 map clearly and undoubtedly violates the requirements of article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution, and affirmed the lower court’s judgment defeating Appellants’ claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.

Jake Maggard, et al. vs. State of Missouri, et al., SC 101581 (Mo. banc May 12, 2026)

Summary: 

The Missouri Supreme Court held that filing a referendum petition does not automatically suspend a legislative act under the Missouri Constitution. The petitioners had not yet had supporting signatures verified and certified by the Missouri Secretary of State; the Supreme Court stated that suspension occurs only if the petition is determined to be legal, sufficient, and timely.   

Plaintiffs had submitted such a petition challenging the Missouri General Assembly’s redrawing of congressional districts (HB 1) despite no census certification, and differing materially from the 2002 map adopted following the national consensus conducted that year. Plaintiffs contended principally that HB 1 was suspended until voters could decide on it by virtue of the referendum petition’s filing on December 9, 2025.  

Following a bench trial, the circuit court (Cole County) dismissed the referendum petition for lack of ripeness and standing, per the political question doctrine and due to the existence of a sufficient statutory remedy. It further declared that HB 1 was not automatically suspended by virtue of the filing of the referendum petition and that the relevant statutes (art. III, sections 49, 52(a) and 52(b)) were not unconstitutional as applied. 

Facts:  

HB 1 was enacted by the General Assembly in September 2025, codified as sections 128.345, 128.346, 128.348 and 128.471 through 128.479, and effective December 11, 2025. It repealed congressional districts established in 2022 and established new districts notwithstanding that there had been no certification of a new census to the governor.

Appellants were two Missouri voters who each would reside in a new congressional district under HB 1. Their single-count petition sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that HB 1 was automatically suspended under the Missouri Constitution upon filing of the referendum petition. They further alleged that, to the extent that sections 116.130 or 116.150 permit the secretary of state to delay suspension of a referred law until issuance of a certificate of sufficiency, they conflict with article III, sections 49, 52(a) and (b) and hence are unconstitutional. They also sought an injunction prevention establishment of HB 1’s congressional map until voters approved it through the referendum process. 

The circuit court held a bench trial on stipulated evidence. It entered judgment against Appellants, dismissing their petition for lack of standing and, alternatively, for lack of ripeness; for presenting a nonjusticiable political question; and for seeking a declaratory judgment when an adequate statutory remedy exists. It alternatively reached the merits and declared that HB 1 was not automatically suspended as of December 9, when the referendum petition was filed.

Reasoning: 

The Missouri Supreme Court noted that Appellants did not challenge the secretary of state’s refusal to certify a referendum, not that did the certification process is statutorily delegated to the secretary of state. The Appellants further agreed that they did not seek to interfere with that process. Instead, Appellants asserted that the case involved a single, narrow, purely legal issue: what is the status of HB 1 in the meantime, i.e., while the supporting signatures are being verified.

The Court stated that it “need look no further” than the plain language of article III, sections 49, 52(a) and 52(b).” According to the Court, nothing in those sections provides that the filing of a referendum petition alone automatically suspends the act of the General Assembly at issue. And nowhere do they use the words “suspend,” “suspension,” or the like. Further, it was stipulated that the secretary had not issued a certificate of sufficiency as to the referendum petition and that the statutory deadline for certificate issuance had not passed.

Appellants argued that article III, section 52(b) supports their automatic suspension position. That section provides that “Any measure referred to the people shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes case thereon, and not otherwise.” The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that under the plain language of sections 52(a) and (b) no measure is referred to the people until the signature requirement is satisfied. “While article III, section 52(b) addresses when ‘any measure’ takes effect after having been referred to the people, it does not provide the mere filing of a referendum petition automatically suspends the act of the General Assembly at issue.”

Per the Court, Appellants did not show that the secretary could have determined, or did determine, compliance with the signature requirement by December 9, when the referendum petition was filed. To the contrary, the referendum petition organizer had written that “[A]cceptance of this referendum and issuance of this receipt does not constitute a determination by the [s]ecretary [ ] that the petition was submitted in accordance with Chapter 116 RSMo.”

The Supreme Court  stated that, “[O]nly when the chapter 116 certification process is final (i.e., when the secretary has issued a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency under section 116.150 and the judicial review of that certificate the General Assembly authorized in section 116.200 is complete) can it be determined whether the referendum petition was “legal, sufficient, and timely” (or not) when it was filed on December 9.” Further, “[I]f the December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be insufficient, HB 1 became the law on December 11 under article III, section 29 because no ‘legal, sufficient, and timely’ referendum petition was filed before expiration of the 90-day period in article III, section 52(a).” (Citing State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman, 250 S.W.2d 701, 703, 705-07 (Mo. banc 1952).)

In contrast, “[I]f, however, the December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be sufficient, article III, section 52(b) applies. In that case, because a legal, sufficient, and timely referendum petition was filed on December 9—before HB 1 went into effect on December 11—HB 1 did not take effect on December 11, HB 1 was ‘referred to the people’ as of December 9, and HB 1 ‘shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 52(b).’”

The Court rejected Appellants’ heavy reliance on Kemper v. Carter, 165 S.W. 773, 779 (Mo. banc 1914), which held that the filing of a legal, sufficient and timely referendum petition suspends any act of the General Assembly at issue in the petition. “This case before the Court here is distinguishable, because Kemper does not resolve the legal issue presented here, because it involved an admittedly sufficient [referendum] petition.”

Thus, the Court reasoned, because the certification process is ongoing and not finally determined, “it is impossible to say as of this opinion whether the December 9 referendum filing petition was ‘legal, sufficient and timely’” and which of the above results apply. 

Conclusion:

Having found no conflict, on the facts of the case, between article III, sections 49, 52(a), and 52(b) and sections 116.130 and 116.150 as to Appellants’ argument the December 9 referendum petition filing automatically suspended HB 1, the Court rejected Appellants’ as-applied challenge to the constitutional validity of sections 116.130 and 116.150 and affirmed the decision below.

Cox, et al. v. Grady Hotel Investments, LLC, et al., SC101131 (Mo. banc April 21, 2026)

Summary:

This case centered on a dispute concerning realty tax assessment valuation, and the standing of the Park Hill School District and Platte County Assessor to challenge the assessment.

Grady Hotel Investments, LLC purchased improvements (including a Marriot hotel) to land owned by the City of Kansas City, but not the land itself, which continued to be owned by the City. In 2016, the Platte County assessor valued the improvements at $11.22 million. This assessed amount was subsequently upped to $13.4 million by the Platte County Board of Equalization.  

That assessment was administratively appealed, and the full State Tax Commission (STC) ultimately valued the improvements at $0 (i.e., the difference between economic rent and the contract rent for use and occupancy of the premises) on the basis that the interest of Grady was in the nature of a leasehold. The matter proceeded to the Circuit Court of Platte County, which found that Grady owned (as opposed to leased) the improvements. As such, the STC’s leasehold valuation method did not apply. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded the case for a new valuation.

Upon remand, the STC assessed the property at more than $6 million. This led to an appeal by the Assessor and the School District, who raised constitutional issues as to the valuation statute, section 137.115.1. The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately held that the School District’s pecuniary interest did not create standing to challenge another party’s property valuation. The Assessor also lacked standing as to certain claims (due process and special privilege provisions) but did have standing to challenge the statute under other provisions (tax exemption and uniformity). However, as to the latter two, the Court held that the statute did not create an unconstitutional tax exemption, nor did it violate the uniformity clause.  

Facts:  

Grady Hotel Investments, LLC, purchased the Marriot Hotel in 2015 from Host Hotels & Resorts, L.P., for $8.5 million. The land, which lies within boundaries of the Kansas City International Airport, remains titled as property of the City of Kansas City (“City”). Grady purchased a possessory interest to the improvements on that parcel, such that Grady owns the hotel building situated on airport property, but not the land itself. The City, a political subdivision of the state, is exempt from paying property taxes. Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 6. Grady, however, is required to pay property taxes on the property improvements, i.e. the hotel building. Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 4(b); art. X, sec. 4(c).

In the 2016 tax year, Assessor valued the hotel at $11,222,000, a determination that Grady appealed to the Platte County Board of Equalization. The Board increased the value of the hotel to $13,447,000. Grady appealed the Board’s decision to the State Tax Commission (“STC”). An STC hearing officer set aside the Board’s evaluation and set the valuation at $7.3 million. The hearing officer purported to apply section 137.115.1 by taking the price of the sale of the improvements—$8.5 million—less the cost paid toward new construction of the improvements—$1.2 million. Grady appealed that decision to the full STC, which determined that Grady held a leasehold interest in the hotel.  As such, it valued the property as the difference between economic rent and the contract rent for use and occupancy of the premises. As a result, the STC held the property’s value to be $0.  

The Assessor appealed the STC’s decision to the Platte County Circuit Court, and the School District was permitted to intervene. The circuit court determined that STC’s $0 valuation was arbitrary, capricious and unsupported by law, and that its use of a leasehold-based valuation was inappropriate because Grady owned (did not merely lease) the improvements. The Court of Appeals agreed and remanded the case back to the STC. An STC hearing officer’s methodology subtracted the value of personal property ($1,160,495) and the cost of new construction and improvements ($1.2 million) from the purchase price ($8.5 million) for a valuation of $6,139,505. The full STC affirmed.

Back to the circuit court went the parties, with the Assessor (joined by the School District) challenging the constitutional validity of section 137.115.1.: (a) as being void for vagueness, (b) giving Grady an unconstitutional tax exemption, (c) violating the uniformity provision, and (d) as granting an irrevocable special privilege. The circuit court affirmed the STC’s decision. The matter proceeded to the Missouri Supreme Court due to the question of the constitutionality of section 137.115.1.

Reasoning:   

Noting that standing is a prerequisite to the Court’s authority to address substantive issues, the Supreme Court assessed (1) whether appellants respectively had protectable interests at stake, and (2) whether the controversy was ripe for judicial determination.

As to the School District, the Court noted that under Missouri law individual plaintiffs – be they corporations, individuals, or school districts – lack standing to challenge other taxpayers’ property tax assessments because they are not personally injured by others’ assessment calculations. (Citing State ex rel. Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. McBeth, 322 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Mo. banc 2010)). McBeth, and the Supreme Court here, drew a distinction between a School District bringing a declaratory judgment, i.e., seeking a declaration of its own rights, and intervening in the appeal of another’s tax assessment. Thus, the School Board’s argument that it had standing because its “unique economic interest” derives funding from property taxes was unavailing.

As to the Assessor, its sundry arguments for standing partially failed. He argued that the failure of section 137.115.1 to define the term “new construction and improvements” renders it void for vagueness under the Missouri due process clause (art.1, sect. 10). The latter states that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” However, the Court noted that political subdivisions do not enjoy the same rights as Missouri citizens, and that “creatures of the state,” such as assessors (and school districts) are not “persons” within the protections of the due process clause and cannot charge the state with violations of due process.

The Assessor further urged that section 137.115.1 violates art. I, sect. 13 of the Missouri Constitution. Section 13, which provides “no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.” Assessor claimed that because, under the statute, Grady is allowed to deduct the cost of new construction and improvements from the value of the hotel, the provision gives him an irrevocable special privilege that does not apply to similar properties not within airport boundaries.  

Again, however, the Court emphasized that “political actors do not enjoy the same constitutional protections as Missouri citizens.”  Additionally, “[Both] the retrospective law clause and the special privilege and immunity clause are in article I, section 13 of our citizen bill of rights. This bill of rights was established to protect citizens, not state or political actors. Mo. Mun. League v. State, 489 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Mo. banc 2016).”

Assessor also advanced arguments under Article X of the Missouri Constitution. The Court found that Assessor had standing to bring these claims. “While the Assessor’s duties are statutory, not constitutional, this Court has recognized standing when an Assessor challenges a statute affecting his duties. See Johnson v. Springfield Solar  LLC, 648 S.W.3d 101 (Mo. banc 2022).”

The Assessor challenged section 137.115.1 under article X, asserting it creates a tax exemption because Grady will be able to continually deduct new construction and improvements from the value, which will eventually reach $0. Assessor also contends section 137.115.1 treats the hotel differently than like properties near it and, as such, violates the uniformity clause. However, the Court found that Section 137.115.1 does not lead to a tax exemption. A tax exemption is “freedom from a duty, liability, or other requirement; an exception or an amount allowed as a deduction from adjusted gross income, used to determine taxable income.” Airport Tech Partners v. State, 462 S.W.3d 740, 743 n.3 (Mo. banc 2015).  Thus, section 137.115.1 does not grant Grady freedom from tax liability.

Moreover, Article X, section 6 states, “All laws exempting from taxation property other than the property enumerated in this article, shall be void.” As such, “[T]he constitution sets out the universe of property exempt from taxation. In doing so, it clearly expresses the people’s intent that only a limited number of properties may be exempted from taxation.” Springfield Solar, 648 S.W.3d at 103-04.

Finally, Assessor argued that section 137.115.1 violates the uniformity clause in article X, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution, contending the hotel is not being taxed uniformly as similar properties in the same subclass. Article X, section 3 states, in relevant part, that taxes “shall be uniform upon the same class or subclass of subjects.” The uniformity clause requires taxes to be: “(1) uniform; (2) upon the same class or subclass of subjects; (3) within the territorial limits; (4) of the authority levying the tax.” Armstrong-Trotwood v. State Tax Comm’n, 516 S.W.3d 830, 835-36 (Mo. banc 2017). Article X, section 3 also provides that, “the methods of determining the value of property for taxation shall be fixed by law.”

Noting that, while the subject clause requires the tax rate for the same subclass of property to be uniform, it does not require property values and valuation methods to be uniform. As such, the uniformity clause does not apply to valuations or impose obligations on authorities responsible for valuing or assessing property.

Thus, while finding that the Assessor had standing to assert his article X claims, section 137.115.1 does not create an unconstitutional tax exemption under article X, section 6, nor does it violate the uniformity clause of article X, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution.

Conclusion:  

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, for the reasons stated. 

Wilkinson v. Farmers Holding Companies, SC101268 (Mo. banc April 21, 2026)

Summary:

This case centered on whether summary judgement was appropriately granted pursuant to applicable Missouri requirements for summary judgment practice.

Plaintiff sent a certified letter to his former employer requesting a service letter after his employment was terminated. When the employer did not respond, Plaintiff sued, alleged a violation of section 290.140 for failing to provide the service letter. His additional claim for disability discrimination was dismissed in federal court, and his state claim was remanded to state court.  

Summary judgment was granted by the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County on the basis that the service letter and lawsuit named the incorrect corporate entity. Plaintiff failed in various respects to properly respond to the summary judgment motion in the manner required by Rule 74.04(c)(2). The court found no genuine issues of material fact after deeming the factual statements admitted.

The Missouri Supreme Court used the occasion to reiterate the requirements for summary judgment practice, stating that summary judgement is not an “extreme or drastic remedy.” There being a failure to preserve the record or make arguments demonstrating errors by the circuit could, summary judgment was affirmed.

Facts:    

Plaintiff Lucas Wilkinson worked as a wet plant foreman at Capital Sand (the d/b/a of the named Defendant) until his employment was terminated in January 2022. In April 2022, Wilkinson sent a certified letter to “Farmer Holding Co.” requesting a service letter per section 290.140. After receiving no response, Wilkinson sued Farmers, alleging violation of that section.

Without answering or advancing affirmative defenses, Farmers moved for summary judgment on the basis that Wilkinson had not sent the service letter to or sued his actual employer, which Defendant contended to be Capital Sand Proppants, LLC. Wilkinson had received his W-2’s from that entity.

Reasoning:  

The Supreme Court first rejected Wilkinson’s characterization of summary judgement as an “extreme and drastic remedy.” It repeated language from ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am Marine Supply Co., 854 S.W. 2d 371, 377-78 (Mo. banc 1993): “To the extent that trial and appellate courts are of the impression that the ‘slightest doubt’ standard defeats summary judgment when any doubt exists, no matter how unreasonable, the standard [h]as been misapplied and is now abandoned.”

Wilkinson argued that “numerous genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute.”  The Court addressed this by quoting the requirements of Rule 74.04(c)(2) concerning summary judgment responses, including that a response must “set forth each statement of fact in its original paragraph number and immediately thereafter admit or deny each of movant’s factual statements” and requiring the response to “support each denial with specific references to the discovery, exhibits or affidavits that demonstrate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”  

Instead, Wilkinson filed a document entitled “Answer and Counter Affidavit,” setting out newly numbered paragraphs referencing several of Farmers’ individual statements of fact – without repeating those facts as required – and either admitted or denied them in bulk. The purported denials made no specific reference to supporting materials. This violated Rule 74.04(c)(2)’s requirement that “[A] denial may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleading.” The Court also noted that the same subsection provides that failure to comply with the Rule “with respect to any numbered paragraph in movant’s statement is an admission of truth of that numbered paragraph.” Thus, Wilkson’s non-compliance with the Rule resulted in admission of the truth of each of Farmers’ statements of material fact.

Nor did Wilkinson set forth further additional material facts that remained in dispute, as permitted by Rule 74.04(c)(1). Various bare allegations made by Wilkinson were not in the prescribed form and no references were made to supporting materials in the record, as required.  

Thus, Wilkinson failed to establish any issue of genuine material fact that remained in issue, such that summary judgment was appropriate.   

The Court added: “This is not to say the circuit court had to enter summary judgement in Farmers’ favor based on the inappropriate summary judgment response.” It referenced the language of Rule 74.04.(c)(6) that summary judgment shall be entered …when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” However, Wilkinson did not argue the point in his opening brief that (nor did he do so at the circuit court level) that, even absent a genuine material fact dispute, summary judgement was not available under the law.  And indeed Wilkinson apparently recognized this prospect, filing a reply brief raising the new argument that summary judgement was precluded as a matter of law, i.e., that Farmers failed to comply with Rule 55.08 by failing to file an answer asserting, as an affirmative defense, Wilkinson’s noncompliance with section 290.140.  

The Court made short work of dispensing with this belated argument, noting that [“[T]his Court’s appellate rules preclude new issues from being raised in a reply brief.” Rule 84.04(d)(1)(A).  And, under Rule 84.13(a), “[A]llegations of error not briefed or not properly briefed shall not be considered in any civil appeal [.]” 

It also rejected the notion that the “de novo” standard of review provided Wilkinson with the opportunity to raise the “matter of law” argument for the first time on appeal, where it was not raised or preserved. “Wilkinson misunderstands de novo review. ‘[T]his Court reviews the circuit court’s grant of summary judgement de novo. But this standard of review does not alter that appellants always bear the burden of establishing error whatever the standard of review. City of De Soto v. Parson, 625 S.W.3d 412, 416 n. 3 (Mo. banc 2021).” Also, “[a] contrary rule would require this Court to become an advocate for Wilkinson by raising sua sponte arguments he did not raise in the circuit court or on appeal and to which Farmers had no opportunity to respond…It follows that Wilkinson failed to properly preserve the argument he raises for the first time in his reply brief.”

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that it court did not err in entering summary judgment for Farmers.

More than one million people in the United States benefit from Temporary Protected Status (TPS).¹ Moreover, temporary protected status is granted when conditions in various countries temporarily prevent their nationals from returning safely, or, in certain circumstances, when the government is unable to adequately handle the return of its nationals.²

The Secretary of Homeland Security designates which countries qualify for this protected status.³ When considering country conditions, the Secretary may designate a country for TPS due to a number of atrocities.⁴ Individuals who are TPS beneficiaries or preliminarily found eligible for TPS upon initial review of their cases are not removable from the United States, may obtain an employment authorization document (EAD), and may be granted travel authorization.⁵ Once granted TPS, an individual cannot be detained by DHS based on their immigration status in the United States.⁶

Still, in light of these privileges, it is essential to note that Temporary Protected Status is true to its name: it is a temporary benefit with no possibility of ripening into lawful permanent residence or any other immigration status.⁷ Although an individual may apply for other non-immigrant statuses or immigration benefits, they must separately meet all eligibility requirements for those benefits.⁸ In turn, TPS beneficiaries work, travel, and build lives in the United States, understanding that they risk losing everything.

This risk became a reality for Diana Orellana, a single mother of two and grandmother.⁹ Diana came to the U.S. from Honduras more than 25 years ago fleeing domestic violence, poverty, and crime.¹⁰ Despite the trauma inflicted on her by her home country, Ms. Orellana, upon coming to the United States, not only cared for her family but also established a career in healthcare.¹¹

Nevertheless, in July of 2025, the Department of Homeland Security stated that, with “improved conditions” in Honduras, DHS was planning to end TPS for Hondurans.¹² However, for Hondurans in the United States, these “improved conditions” are a falsehood. As Ms. Orellana states, “The Department of Homeland Security says Honduras has improved conditions ... no! Not at all ...” (McLister, 2025).¹³ Aside from the risks of returning for all Hondurans, Ms. Orellana also faces the cruel reality of personal abuse if she returns, as she states, “the person who violated me is still there. What's going to happen?”¹⁴

Ms. Orellana is not the only one asking this question; many TPS beneficiaries are held in a state of vulnerability with the ebbs and flows of DHS determinations¹⁵ The case of Diana Orellana illustrates the risks of return for TPS beneficiaries across the United States. While trying to figure out what the future holds, Ms. Orellana states, “How can you pack your life in two weeks, two months ... how can you pick up everything?”¹⁶ With one statement, DHS pulled Ms. Orellana away from the life she created despite the abuse and hardships she endured. Ms. Orellana is not alone.

In March of 2025, 51,225 Hondurans held Temporary Protected Status in the United States.¹⁷ Now, each of these individuals must close the door on the lives they created. The revocation of TPS status for Honduras is one to consider and fear for other individuals who hold TPS. As of March 2025, excluding Hondurans, there are 1,246,410 TPS beneficiaries in the United States.¹⁸ With one statement from the Department of Homeland Security, over a million people can be subjected to the same cruel reality as Ms. Orellana. One day, you are building a family and a life, and with one statement, DHS can have you returning to a place that is no longer home.

Accordingly, this article focuses on the fluctuating positionality of individuals who benefit from TPS in the United States, and examines the United States' obligations to continue, expand, and find alternatives to TPS.

“How long can I stay?”

DHS has a history of arbitrarily determining which states qualify for, or do not qualify for, temporary protection. For example, Montserrat illustrates the arbitrariness of the determination process.¹⁹ The island had been evacuated due to volcanic activity and the destruction it caused.²⁰ Despite the volcano’s devastation and ongoing effects on the island, DHS terminated Montserrat's designation on February 27, 2005.²¹ To further exemplify the ongoing threats to the nationals from that region, when TPS was terminated in Montserrat, the nation had no airport.²² Additionally, the country was still deemed an unsafe place to live.²³ Despite the clear humanitarian crisis of the nation, “nationals of Montserrat were thrown out of a country they had lived in for eight years and were not even able to fly home because there was no open airport at which they could safely land.”²⁴

TPS is frequently terminated even when the designated region remains unstable or unsafe for its nationals.²⁵ As exemplified by Diana Orellana's story in the introduction to this text, the inability of beneficiaries to track the logic and trajectory of their status is a significant source of stress and fear for immigrants and their futures in the United States.

The Mental Health Impacts on Beneficiaries and Their Families

Immigration limbo is a fear that transcends the issue of TPS. For example, detention and deportation also affect the health outcomes of those in limbo, leading to higher rates of “depression, anxiety, stress, somatic symptoms, anger, low self-esteem, and behavioral problems.”²⁶ These mental health impacts of possessing a fluctuating legal status are not isolated to those directly affected but also affect their families and children. More specifically, individuals living in limbo tend to “isolate themselves and their children from the community, which can negatively affect their children’s development.”²⁷ Not only is social integration and community limited, but so is education – fearing family separation leads parents in fluctuating or unstable immigration statuses to want to keep their children at home rather than sending them to school.²⁸

Additionally, the quasi-permanence of TPS has led families to live in fear for long periods, knowing there is a possibility they could lose everything. For example, TPS was terminated for many individuals from Central America; as a result, thousands of children, “many of whom are U.S. citizens, now experience the burden of their parents’ precarious immigration status, in addition to the weight of the trauma that propelled their parents’ flight to the United States”²⁹

Indirectly, when a child’s parent is deported or at risk of deportation, the child is also placed in limbo, potentially required to leave the United States even if they are a citizen, to prevent family separation.³⁰ Additionally, upon return to their parents’ home country, children may be subjected to the same inhumane or troublesome situation that caused their parent to leave their home nation to begin with.³¹

In being threatened with leaving behind the only life they have ever known and facing the unknown, these children also face long-term mental health and physical health problems as a result of the burden of knowing their parents may be deported.³²

International Law Obligations

According to Article 6 of the United States Constitution, the Constitution and all laws of the United States, “shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land…”³³ Treaties thus constitute part of the “supreme law of the land,” and when the United States enters or ratifies a treaty, it becomes the law of the land.³⁴

The U.S. ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1992 (ACLU, 2013). Article 6 of the ICCPR states that every human being has the right to life.³⁵ Sending nationals back to states that are actively in crisis puts those individuals’ lives at risk. As made clear in the Montserrat example, the United States has made arbitrary decisions regarding when human life is at risk and when it is not. In turn, forcing TPS beneficiaries to return to their home countries may violate their right to life under Article 6 if the risks associated with return remain.

Moreover, Article 9 of the ICCPR further reinforces the rights to liberty and security.³⁶ On October 3, 2025, former Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem determined that Venezuela no longer met the conditions for its designation for Temporary Protected Status (TPS), and that the termination of the 2023 Venezuela TPS designation was required, as it was contrary to the national interest (USCIS). Still, had the conditions in Venezuela changed sufficiently to warrant the safe return of Venezuelan nationals?

With the mass rates of arbitrary killings and detentions under Venezuela’s current regime, Venezuela again illustrates how ending TPS for some beneficiaries would mean depriving individuals of liberty and security.³⁷ As made clear by the country conditions in Venezuela, human rights issues surrounding liberty and security remain largely unchanged compared to previous years, during which DHS deemed Venezuela eligible for TPS.

Moreover, the obligations of the ICCPR do not end at security and safety, but also extend to human dignity, respect, and the rights of individuals to have and maintain “privacy, family, home or correspondence” while also protecting individuals from “unlawful attacks on [their] honour and reputation.”³⁸

By putting TPS beneficiaries in limbo, the United States disrespects and dishonors these individuals and the traumas they have endured to arrive in the United States. TPS’s legal limbo further traumatizes already marginalized and traumatized communities.³⁹ Entire immigrant households and communities are put in disarray, not just the beneficiaries of TPS.⁴⁰ More specifically, United States immigration policies have led to a silent form of humanitarian abuse: “The mental health impact of immigration policies extends far beyond individuals, affecting entire generations of migrant families and shaping the societal fabric of host communities” (Dadras & Hazratzai, 2025). In research conducted on the ramifications of long-term exposure to immigration enforcement policies, these policies were found to be linked to “cumulative trauma” and “intergenerational cycles of mental health disorders and legal precarity.”⁴¹ Entire families and communities are being torn apart or tormented for generations.

It is essential to note that the right to uphold the family unit is not limited to the ICCPR. Article 17(1) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights provides: “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state.” This American Convention follows the logic of Article 16 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides: “1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honor and reputation. 2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” Although the United States is the only country not to have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the aforementioned American Convention and the ICCPR have affirmed that the United States must safeguard and respect the family unit.⁴²

Accordingly, when evaluating how the United States is implementing either Convention, it is clear that the U.S. is failing to do so as family units are regularly divided or are subject to division through the current TPS immigration framework.⁴³

TPS - A Starting Place, Not the Finish Line

As it stands, TPS has no means of ripening into something more than a temporary solution (USCIS, 2025). Still, TPS is rooted in the United States’ commitment to nonrefoulement. As outlined in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United States is a party to, “a refugee should not be returned to a country where he or she faces serious threats to his or her life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”⁴⁴ Congress developed the TPS program in the 1990s to address a gap in the INA for individuals who did not meet the requirements for asylum but still faced grave dangers of returning to their home countries. In turn, the list of TPS-eligible nations grew with time.⁴⁵ Still, TPS’s structure remained constant—beneficiaries could stay and work in the United States—but their homes and lives were built on the flimsy eligibility determinations issued by the Department of Homeland Security.

By subjecting beneficiaries, their families, and their communities to the legal and emotional limbo of TPS, with no hope of advancing their status, the United States raises concerns for its lack of mandatory compliance to its obligations under ICCPR articles 6, 9, 10, and 17. Correspondingly, the United States is arguably violating its treaty obligations and going back on the word of its constitution (U.S. Const. art. VI, §2).

TPS has been overextended and strayed from its original purpose, but this does not mean it should be abandoned without an alternative. In turn, one of the leading alternative systems to TPS is the complementary system.⁴⁶ More specifically, many countries conduct a two-pronged assessment when considering protection claims, as seen, for example, in several European Union member states.⁴⁷ The first step in the examination is to use the definition of refugee from the 1951 Refugee Convention: a refugee is an individual who has “a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”⁴⁸ For individuals who do not meet this standard, they can alternatively qualify as a complementary protected person if they can prove that they “would face a real risk of serious harm for reasons other than a fear of persecution.”⁴⁹ In the EU, recipients of this complementary status are also entitled to additional social benefits.⁵⁰

Additionally, these individuals receive residency permits valid for at least one year, renewable for at least two years.⁵¹ Frelick also posits that Asylum and Complementary status should be adjudicated simultaneously, and that TPS should be reserved exclusively for mass influxes that overwhelm the asylum system.⁵²

In establishing the changes mentioned above, this article recommends that Congress expand the pie for TPS beneficiaries.⁵³ The status should have a pathway towards ripening. In light of the United States’ commitments to individuals’ rights to nationality and security, beneficiaries need a viable path out of limbo. As such, not only should the complementary system be considered, but TPS beneficiaries should have a path towards ripening their status.

---

¹ , Temporary Protected Status (TPS): Fact Sheet, Nat'l Immigr. F. (Oct. 7, 2025), https://forumtogether.org/article/temporary-protected-status-fact-sheet/

² , Temporary Protected Status, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Mar. 17, 2026), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status.

³ Id. (under what is TPS)

⁴ Id.

⁵ Id.

⁶ Id.

⁷ Id.

⁸ Id.

⁹ Frankie McLister, Eagan Woman from Honduras Forced to Leave U.S. After Trump Administration Ends her Temporary Protected Status, CBS NEWS (2025),

https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/eagan-woman-honduras-temporary-protected-status/ .

¹⁰ Id.

¹¹ Id.

¹² U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., With Improved Conditions, DHS Ends TPS for Honduras (July 7, 2025), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/07/07/improved-conditions-dhs-ends-tps-honduras.

¹³ McLister, supra note 9.

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ Id.

¹⁶ Id.

¹⁷ Nat'l Immigr. F., Temporary Protected Status (TPS): Fact Sheet (Oct. 7, 2025), https://forumtogether.org/article/temporary-protected-status-fact-sheet/

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁹ Eva Segerblom, Temporary Protected Status: An Immigration Statute That Redefines Traditional Notions of Status and Temporariness, 7 Nev. L.J. 664, 674 (2007).

²⁰ Id.

²¹ Id.

²² Id.

²³ Id.

²⁴ Id.

²⁵ Ryan Thoreson, Venezuela Events of 2024, HUM. RTS. WATCH ( Dec. 20, 2024), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/venezuela

²⁶ Myriam Valero, U. S. Immigration policy: Mental health impacts of increased detentions and deportations., APA (Sep 1, 2025). https://www.apa.org/monitor/2025/09/mental-health-immigration-enforcement.

²⁷ Id.

²⁸ Id.

²⁹ Lisseth Rojas-Flores et al., Protecting U.S.-Citizen Children Whose Central American Parents Have Temporary Protected Status, Vol. 8(1):14-19 (2019).

³⁰ Liela Schochet & Nicole Svajlenka, How Ending TPS Will Hurt U.S.-Citizen Children, Center for American Progress (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/ending-tps-will-hurt-u-s-citizen-children/

³¹ Id.

³² U.S. Citizen Children Impacted by Immigration Enforcement, American Immigration Council (June 24, 2021), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/us-citizen-children-impacted-immigration-enforcement/

³³ U.S. Const. Art. VI.

³⁴ Id.

³⁵ International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1973, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

³⁶ Id.

³⁷ Supra note 25.

³⁸ Supra note 35, articles 10 and 17(1).

³⁹ Dadras & Hazratzai, The Silent Trauma: U.S. Immigration Policies and Mental Health, Vol. 44 The Lancet, (2025).

⁴⁰ Id.

⁴¹ Id.

⁴² Sarah Mehta, There’s only one country that hasn’t ratified the Convention on Children’s Rights: US, ACLU, (Nov. 20, 2015),

https://www.aclu.org/news/human-rights/theres-only-one-country-hasnt-ratified-convention-childrens#:~:text=There ’s%20Only%20One%20Country%20That,US%20%7C%20American%20Civil%20Liberties%20Union.

⁴³ Maanvi Singh, Trump Revives Family Separations Amid Drive to Deport Millions: ‘A tactic to punish’, Th Gaurdian, Oct. 2, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2025/oct/02/trump-immigration-family-separations-deportations

⁴⁴ Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223; 606 U.N.T.S. 267.

⁴⁵ Temporary Protected Status (TPS), U.S. Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protected-status.

⁴⁶ Bill Frelick, What’s Wrong with Temporary Protected Status and How to Fix It: Exploring a Complementary Protection Regime, Vol. 8, J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. , 42 (Feb 26, 2020).

⁴⁷ Id.

⁴⁸ Id.

⁴⁹ Id.

⁵⁰ Id. at 49-50.

⁵¹ Id. at 50.

⁵² Id.

⁵³ Bill Frelick, What’s Wrong with Temporary Protected Status and How to Fix It: Exploring a Complementary Protection Regime, Vol. 8, J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. , (Feb 26, 2020).

Introduction

On June 4, 2025, President Donald Trump enacted Presidential Proclamation 10949. This Proclamation restricted the entry of foreign nationals to protect the United States from foreign terrorists and other national security and public safety threats.[i] Proclamation 10949 was a stepping stone in the policy behind enacting Executive Order 14161, which sought to protect the United States from foreign terrorists and other national security and public safety threats.[ii] In enacting Proclamation 10949, President Trump stated “that the United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those aliens approved for admission into the United States do not intend to harm Americans or our national interests.”[iii]

President Trump then directed multiple heads of federal departments to identify countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the admission of nationals from those countries.[iv] Ultimately, this resulted in full suspension of entry for nationals of twelve countries and partial suspension of entry for nationals of an additional seven countries.[v]

On December 16, 2025, President Trump then enacted Presidential Proclamation 10998.[vi] This Proclamation, which is an extension of Proclamation 10949 to further the Policy of Executive Order 14161, furthered the measures listed out in Proclamation 10949.[vii] Proclamation 10998 modified the list of countries whose nationals are suspended or limited from entering the United States entry to thirty-nine.[viii]

Adjudication Holds

On January 1, 2026, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) released a Policy Memorandum (PM-602-0194).[ix] The purpose of PM-602-0194 was to place a hold on all pending benefit applications for persons who were listed under Proclamation 10998 pending a comprehensive review, regardless of entry date.[x] This memo immediately placed an adjudicative hold on all pending and any future USCIS benefit applications filed by or on behalf of individuals connected to the countries listed under Proclamation 10998.[xi]

PM-602-0194 makes clear that that the pause applies to the adjudication of all benefit applications such as: I-129, Form I-140, Form I-539, and Form I-765.[xii] Under this policy announcement, immigration benefits applications by nationals from counties and entities currently subject to travel restrictions continue to be accepted and processed.[xiii] However, final adjudication may not be made until USCIS operationalizes procedures for additional screening or otherwise decides to remove the hold.[xiv]

With these adjudication holds, affected individuals face longer processing times, potential evidence requests, and interviews.[xv] Individuals also face delays in employment authorizations, extensions, changes of status, and the ability to secure advance parole.[xvi] There is potential for benefits that were approved on or after January 20, 2021 to be reopened for scrutiny and as a result, USCIS may request additional documentation, relocation of biometrics, and interviews.[xvii] Currently, there seems to be no timeline for when the adjudicative holds will be lifted.[xviii]

The Judicial Landscape

Among the federal courts there seems to be a trend in disagreeing with the USCIS policy pausing applications from all immigrants from the thirty-nine countries that have been either suspended or limited from entering the United States.[xix] In Saghafi v. Edlow, a Maryland case decided in April, the court was asked to enjoin the USCIS from applying the adjudicatory hold on the Plaintiff’s Form I-485 application.[xx] In Saghafi, the court held that the status quo consisted of the usual, though sometimes prolonged, processing and adjudications of Form I-485 within a reasonable time and without an adjudicatory hold in place.[xxi]

Therefore, the court, in restoring the status quo, enjoined USCIS from applying the adjudicatory hold to Plaintiff’s application and compelled USCIS to resume adjudication of these forms.[xxii] Ultimately, the court in Edlow found that USCIS has a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate Form 1-485.[xxiii]

Similarly, in Doe v. Trump, a Massachusetts case decided in April, the court was asked to issue a preliminary injunction requiring the federal government to lift the adjudicative hold to Plaintiff’s benefit applications.[xxiv] In Doe, the court found that when Congress directed that USCIS “shall” make a decision on such applications, it imposed a non-discretionary duty to perform.[xxv] The court went on to say that the adjudicative hold policy, which indefinitely halts USCIS’s adjudication of such applications, is contrary to Congress’s command.[xxvi]

Therefore, the court, in analyzing the merits of the case, found that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim and that the adjudicative hold policy is not in accordance with the law.[xxvii] Ultimately, the court enjoined the federal government from enforcing the adjudicative hold policy and were compelled it to lift the adjudicative hold policy for the plaintiffs involved.[xxviii]

Practical Implications

In light of the adjudicative hold policy established through USCIS’s Policy Memorandum PM-602-0194, practitioners should recognize that the current legal landscape presents both significant procedural obstacles and emerging litigation opportunities for affected foreign nationals. While USCIS continues to accept and process applications submitted by nationals from countries listed under Presidential Proclamation 10998, the agency’s refusal to issue final adjudications has created substantial uncertainty for applicants seeking immigration benefits, employment authorization, extensions of status, and adjustment of status relief.

For practicing attorneys, the recent federal district court decisions in Saghafi and Doe provide an important framework for challenging these adjudicative holds. Both courts emphasized that Congress imposed a non-discretionary duty on USCIS to adjudicate immigration benefit applications when statutory language directs that the agency “shall” make a decision.

The reasoning in these cases also suggests that courts may be increasingly receptive to arguments that blanket adjudicative holds exceed USCIS’s lawful authority when those holds effectively suspend adjudications indefinitely rather than regulate the manner in which adjudications occur. Practitioners should therefore monitor developing federal litigation closely, particularly as additional district courts address whether the agency’s implementation of PM-602-0194 conflicts with congressional mandates governing immigration adjudications.

For individuals affected by these policies, applicants should expect increased scrutiny, additional requests for evidence, biometrics rescheduling, and possible interview or re-interview requirements. Maintaining complete documentation, responding timely to agency requests, and ensuring continued lawful status where possible will remain critical while adjudicative holds are in place.

Ultimately, although Presidential Proclamations 10949 and 10998 significantly expanded restrictions on entry and immigration processing for nationals of designated countries, the federal courts have begun signaling limits on USCIS’s ability to indefinitely suspend adjudications through internal policy memoranda. Accordingly, the developing judicial response may become one of the most significant mechanisms through which affected applicants and practitioners challenge prolonged immigration delays arising from the adjudicative hold policy.

Conclusion

In enacting Presidential Proclamations 10949 and 10998, the federal government significantly expanded restrictions on the entry and immigration processing of nationals from designated countries in the name of national security and public safety. Through USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0194, these restrictions extended beyond admission into the United States and into the adjudication of immigration benefit requests, resulting in indefinite delays for thousands of applicants seeking lawful immigration benefits.

However, recent federal district court decisions in Saghafi and Doe demonstrate growing judicial skepticism toward USCIS’s adjudicative hold policy. As litigation surrounding PM-602-0194 continues to develop, the judiciary may play a critical role in defining the limits of executive and administrative authority in immigration adjudications and in determining whether indefinite adjudicative holds are consistent with congressional mandates governing immigration benefits.

I. Introduction

Consider this common scenario to many family law practitioners: a client arrives for a consultation about enforcing a divorce decree years after the marriage was dissolved. The former spouse, a foreign national who obtained lawful permanent residence through the marriage, is now threatening to sue in federal court. However, the basis of the claim is not property division or alimony, but a federal form signed years earlier, as part of the immigration process. The form is I-864, also called the Affidavit of Support.

For practitioners outside immigration law, the Affidavit of Support might be an unfamiliar instrument. For those within it, it is a routine filing. What neither group always appreciates is that the I-864 is not just a form in the bureaucratic sense. It is a legally enforceable federal contract, and it creates obligations that do not dissolve with the marriage, the relationship, or the passage of time.

What most sponsors do not understand at the moment of signing is that the I-864 actually creates two distinct obligations. The first runs to the U.S. government, which retains the right to seek reimbursement from the sponsor if the immigrant receives public benefits. But there is also a second obligation to the sponsored immigrant, who holds an independent right of action, enforceable in federal court without exhausting any administrative process. The sponsor, in other words, signs a binding promise to two separate creditors simultaneously, one institutional and one personal, and the law treats both with equal seriousness.

Law practitioners may encounter the I-864 not as immigration attorneys but as collateral participants: family lawyers negotiating divorce settlements, estate planners advising sponsors, and civil litigators facing unexpected federal claims.

II. Statutory and Regulatory Foundation

The Affidavit of Support is governed by section 213A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1183a[i]. The requirement that sponsors execute a legally enforceable affidavit was introduced by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which replaced what had previously been an unenforceable moral commitment with a binding contractual obligation[ii]. Since 1996, submission of a completed and approved I-864 is mandatory for most family-based immigrant visa petitions and for certain employment-based petitions where the petitioner is a relative of the beneficiary.

The substance of the obligation is straightforward. The sponsor agrees to maintain the sponsored immigrant at an income level not less than 125 percent of the applicable federal poverty guidelines. The obligation is not capped at a fixed dollar amount; it adjusts annually as poverty guidelines are updated. If a sponsor lacks sufficient income to satisfy the threshold, they may contribute income of household members (who will be required to execute Form I-864A) or present a joint sponsor to execute a separate I-864. In that situation, the household members or joint sponsor assume the same full and independent obligation as the primary sponsor.

III. The Nature of the Obligation

The Affidavit's most consequential feature is the identity of the parties who may enforce it. The statute expressly provides that the sponsored immigrant qualifies as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement between the sponsor and the federal government[iii]. This means the immigrant may bring a direct civil action against the sponsor in any federal district court or in a state court of competent jurisdiction, without first seeking administrative relief or exhausting any government process.

The Seventh Circuit addressed the contractual character of the I-864 directly in Liu v. Mund, a suit brought by a sponsored immigrant spouse against her American citizen ex-husband to enforce support obligations. The court rejected Mund’s argument that Liu had a duty to mitigate her damages by seeking employment before enforcing the support obligation. Judge Posner confirmed that the affidavit is an enforceable contract and exists independently of whatever rights the immigrant may or may not have under state divorce law, and that neither the statute nor the affidavit imposes any duty of mitigation on the sponsored immigrant[iv].

The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Erler v. Erler, affirming federal jurisdiction over an I-864 enforcement claim arising out of a post-divorce dispute[v]. These decisions reflect a consistent judicial understanding: once the I-864 is signed and the visa is issued, the sponsor has entered a federal contract, and the immigrant holds the right to sue on it.

The measure of damages in a private enforcement action is the difference between the immigrant's actual income and 125 percent of the poverty guideline for the relevant household size[vi]. Courts have also awarded attorney's fees to prevailing immigrants in appropriate cases, making the exposure for a non-compliant sponsor more significant than the monthly support differential might initially suggest.

IV. When the Obligation Ends

The I-864 obligation terminates upon the occurrence of any one of five conditions enumerated in the statute[vii]. The sponsored immigrant's naturalization as a U.S. citizen is the most common exit, but naturalization for a spouse of a U.S. citizen requires a minimum of three years of continuous lawful permanent residence, and the timeline can be longer, especially in cases of divorce. Alternatively, the obligation ends if the immigrant accumulates forty qualifying quarters of Social Security coverage (roughly ten years of work), permanently departs the United States after losing lawful permanent resident status, obtains a new grant of lawful permanent residence in a separate proceeding, or dies. The sponsor's death also terminates the obligation.

What most people miss is that the list does not include divorce. The dissolution of the marriage has no legal effect on the I-864 obligation. A separation agreement, a divorce decree, prenuptial agreement, or a mutual waiver executed by the parties in a state court proceeding cannot extinguish a federal statutory obligation. Courts presented with this argument have rejected it consistently.

The Ninth Circuit expressly confirmed this understanding in Erler v. Erler, affirming that the sponsor’s obligation from the I-864 remained fully enforceable notwithstanding both a prenuptial agreement waiving alimony and the fact that the sponsored immigrant had been living with and financially supported by her adult son after the divorce[viii]. The sponsor who signed the I-864 remains bound until one of the five statutory conditions is satisfied, regardless of what the parties agreed to in their divorce.

V. Enforcement Mechanisms

The statute provides two parallel enforcement avenues. The first runs through government agencies. Any federal, state, or local agency that provides a means-tested public benefit to a sponsored immigrant may seek reimbursement from the sponsor for the cost of those benefits[ix]. This is a separate and distinct claim from anything the immigrant may bring directly.

The second avenue is private enforcement by the sponsored immigrant. The immigrant may file suit in federal district court or in state court and recover the monthly shortfall between actual income and the 125 percent threshold. A prevailing plaintiff may also recover attorney's fees[x].

The intersection of I-864 enforcement with divorce litigation has produced unsettled law in a number of jurisdictions. State family courts increasingly encounter I-864 claims raised alongside requests for alimony and property division. Whether a state court spousal support award should offset the federal I-864 obligation, or whether the two run independently, is a question courts have answered inconsistently[xi]. Practitioners handling divorce matters involving immigrant spouses should treat these as separate legal issues requiring separate analysis.

One further enforcement issue warrants attention for civil litigators: bankruptcy does not discharge the I-864 obligation. Courts have generally held that the support obligation under the I-864 functions analogously to a domestic support obligation and falls within the non-dischargeability provisions of the Bankruptcy Code[xii]. Therefore, a sponsor who files for bankruptcy relief cannot use it to escape the federal contract.

VI. Practical Guidance for Practitioners

The I-864's reach across multiple practice areas creates obligations for practitioners who may never set foot in an immigration court.

Immigration attorneys bear the primary responsibility for counseling sponsors before the affidavit is signed. That counseling should be thorough, documented, and treated as contract representation. A signed acknowledgment from the sponsor confirming that they understand the obligation's duration, its independence from the marriage, and its enforceability in federal court is a reasonable precaution. The same applies to joint sponsors, who frequently do not understand that they are assuming an independent federal obligation rather than endorsing a character reference. Form I-864A household member signatories[xiii] deserve the same level of disclosure.

Family law attorneys must ask at the outset of any divorce representation involving a foreign national spouse whether an I-864 was ever executed. If it was, the obligation must be factored into settlement negotiations. A divorce decree that purports to release the sponsor from the I-864 provides no legal protection and may give the client a false sense of security. The more defensible approach is to address the obligation transparently in the settlement, acknowledge that it survives the divorce, and account for it in the overall financial resolution.

Estate planning attorneys advising clients with immigrant spouses should also flag the I-864 as a contingent liability. While the obligation does not automatically bind the sponsor's estate, the issue is not fully settled, and failing to identify it during the planning process is an oversight that may later affect estate administration.

Even general civil litigators and criminal defense attorneys should be aware that an I-864 obligation can generate federal civil exposure that clients rarely volunteer.

VII. Conclusion

The I-864 Affidavit of Support is one of the most consequential documents in immigration practice, and one of the most underestimated outside of it. It is a federal contract that survives divorce, resists bankruptcy, and runs independently to two separate creditors: the United States government and the sponsored immigrant personally.

For practitioners across disciplines, the lesson is consistent: treat the I-864 as what it is from the moment of signing. It is not a formality, not a character reference, and not a problem for immigration attorneys alone. It is a binding federal obligation that follows the sponsor into the courtroom, the divorce proceeding, and the bankruptcy petition, and it will not release its hold until the statute says it may.

 

My family celebrated July 4 at North Park, a public park in Pittsburgh. For us it was a special holiday bringing together families and friends to enjoy badminton, swimming, and fireworks. I can still remember who made the potato salad and who grilled the hot dogs.

I don’t recall knowing the significance of Independence Day, but for us it was a day OFF.

My parents ran an economy-priced men’s clothing store in a small mill town called Ambridge, Pennsylvania. It was the home of the American Bridge Company, a division of U. S. Steel. I could stand on my front porch and watch molten steel being poured into large molds. Charles’ Men’s Store was open 6 days a week, and on Sundays we went to wholesale houses to replenish our stock. 

The Fourth was surely a day for our family to be independent from our work week.

By the time I was in my teens, I understood clearly that the Fourth was a celebration of our Constitution and our independence from England. For me, the Constitution meant that we as citizens had more rights than we had historically had. Certainly, something worth celebrating. We lit sparklers and decorated our lawns with flags.

My first year of law school included a course on Constitutional Law. Being one of only nine women students in a school population of 900, I shouldn’t have been surprised to learn that the Declaration of Independence declared that “all men are created equal.” Not only was my professional school male-dominated but so was my country.

Later I learned that it also didn’t include any enslaved Africans nor indigenous people. 

Independence Day became increasingly complicated for me. 

Yes, the colonists fought for their natural right of liberty, but just for them, not for all of us.

When the Declaration was signed, millions of enslaved people were still in bondage, and many of the freedoms being celebrated were never extended to them.

Some have asked, should we celebrate Independence Day or apologize for it?

I believe July 4th can be a time for celebration, not of our Founding Fathers, but rather of leaders who have worked tirelessly to remedy the deficiencies of the Declaration.

In the Seneca Falls Declaration of 1848, Elizabeth Cady Stanton confronted a male-dominated society by using the language of the Declaration: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.” Stanton is to be celebrated. 

We also owe our gratitude for the Declaration of Black Abolitionists which declared the same sentiments. Frederick Douglass called July 4th “a day of mourning, an example of America’s hypocrisy.” He stated that the American people already knew enslaved Black Americans were entitled to liberty. “You have already declared it,” he reminded us. 

Virginia Minor, a St. Louis activist, is worthy of celebration. In 1867 she was a founder of Woman Suffrage Association of Missouri, the first political organization in U.S. history formed solely to secure voting rights for women. She attempted to register to vote in the 1872 presidential election. After being turned away, she sued the local registrar, taking her fight all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Her husband filed the lawsuit on her behalf, as married women were not permitted to file lawsuits.

Even though the Court ruled against her in 1874, it set a monumental precedent, establishing that while women were citizens, voting was not an automatic, inherent right of citizenship on the federal level.

This decision showed that the path for women’s suffrage would be through changing the laws, not challenging them in court.

The St. Louis suffragists should also be celebrated for their courage and persistence. They organized a highly visual protest called the Golden Lane during the 1916 National Democratic Convention. Over 3,000 women, dressed in white and wearing gold sashes, lined the streets leading to the site of the convention, the St. Louis Coliseum, holding yellow parasols. It was a silent “walkless, talkless parade,” designed to confront delegates and demand women’s inclusion in the party platform.

At a time when our Constitution is ignored by our national leaders, I celebrate the courageous judges who hold true to its principles. They are demanding that the rule of law be followed and staying the execution of our government’s actions that blatantly violate due process.

Most recently, leaders of both parties are reaching across the aisle to stand up for what they know is unlawful, the actions that cross the line of dignity and lawfulness.

Each of us has an opportunity to celebrate this holiday by speaking out where we see injustice, representing the defenseless and the oppressed, and by contributing our time and talent to groups that advocate for voter protection and immigration reform.

When we became lawyers, we took an oath to actively use the privilege of being members of the bar. We renew that oath every year on Law Day. Let us make this a law year that we can be proud of and celebrate.