MISSOURI SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT JUDGMENT VACATING CONVICTION UNDER MISSOURI’S INNOCENCE STATUTE DOES NOT RESULT IN DEFENDANT’S IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF CUSTODY.
State ex rel. Andrew Bailey v. Hon. Jason Sengheiser, 692 S.W.3d 20 (Mo. banc 2024).
In 1991, Christopher Dunn was convicted of murder and other offenses and was sentenced to life without parole and consecutive sentences of 90 years. In February 2024, the St. Louis Circuit Attorney filed a motion to vacate Dunn’s conviction pursuant to Missouri’s innocence statute, Section 547.031. That statute, which became effective at the end of August 2021, provided that a prosecuting or circuit attorney in the jurisdiction in which a person was convicted of an offense may file a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment at any time if they have information that the convicted person may be innocent or may have been erroneously convicted. It further provides that the circuit court in which the person was convicted shall have jurisdiction and authority to consider, hear and decide the motion. The statute also provides that the prosecuting attorney or circuit attorney shall have the right to file and maintain an appeal of the denial or disposal of such motion. However, the statute does not provide that the attorney general may appeal from a ruling on such a motion, but it does provide that the attorney general may file a motion to intervene in any appeal.
The circuit court held a hearing on the circuit attorney’s motion, and on July 22, 2024, the court issued a judgment vacating Dunn’s conviction, and ordered his immediate discharge from custody. The attorney general immediately filed a notice of appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.
After Dunn remained incarcerated, the circuit court, on July 24, issued an order directing the Department of Corrections to release Dunn by 6 p.m. that day. Immediately following the entry of this order, the attorney general filed a petition with the Missouri Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or mandamus to prevent the circuit court from ordering Dunn’s release and requested an emergency stay to allow sufficient time for the Court to consider the writ petition. The Supreme Court then issued an order temporarily staying the circuit court proceedings, and directed expedited briefing from the parties on the merits of the attorney general’s position.
In the writ proceedings, the attorney general contended that the innocence statute authorized his appeal of the circuit court’s judgment vacating Dunn’s criminal conviction. The circuit attorney, however, argued that the writ petition should be denied because the innocence statute does not authorize the attorney general to appeal the circuit court’s judgment. The Supreme Court, however, did not resolve this question, stating that “this threshold question need not be addressed in this opinion,” but, rather, “this question can more adequately be raised and resolved in the attorney general’s pending appeal in the court of appeals.”
The Supreme Court reaffirmed a prior holding that proceedings under § 547.031 are civil in nature. The Court noted that an appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case does not automatically stay the execution of such judgment, absent some legal authority to the contrary. The Court pointed out that the attorney general did not identify any applicable authority providing for an automatic stay of judgment entered pursuant to § 547.031. Therefore, the judgment in the case is immediately operative and enforceable.
The Court explained, however, that § 547.031 provides only that the circuit court may sustain a motion to vacate and thereby set aside a criminal conviction; it does not provide that the court may order a defendant’s release from custody. The Court noted that, as with any vacated conviction, the criminal case and the charges as to which the conviction has been vacated are reinstated, and the defendant is remanded to his detention status prior to conviction. While the charges remain pending against Dunn, the State is free to retry him. Of course, the State may elect to dismiss the pending charges or agree to Dunn’s release while the pending charges are resolved.
The Court further noted that the Department of Corrections similarly lacked the authority to detain Dunn once the circuit court vacated and set aside Dunn’s convictions. The Court also noted that the attorney general did not seek a discretionary stay of the judgment from the circuit court or the Court of Appeals. Absence such a stay, the judgment is enforceable and Dunn was ordered to be released from the Department of Corrections’ custody and remanded to the custody of the St. Louis City Department of Public Safety – Division of Corrections as a pretrial detainee.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court issued a writ ordering the circuit court to take no further action to unconditionally release Dunn from custody while the criminal charges against him remain pending.
[Editor’s Note: upon the entry of the Supreme Court’s opinion, the St. Louis Circuit Attorney dismissed the charges against Dunn and he was freed from custody.]
EIGHTH CIRCUIT HOLDS MISSOURI’S SECOND AMENDMENT PRESERVATION ACT VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
U.S. v. State of Missouri, et al., No. 23-147 (8th Cir., August 26, 2024).
In 2021, Missouri enacted the Second Amendment Preservation Act, which states that various federal acts, laws and executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations shall be considered “infringements on the people’s right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution of Missouri.” The Act declares that these federal laws are “invalid to this state,” “shall not be recognized by this state,” and “shall be specifically rejected by this state,” and include the following laws:
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Any tax, levy, fee, or stamp imposed on firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition not common to all other goods and services and that might reasonably be expected to create a chilling effect on the purchase or ownership of those items by law-abiding citizens;
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Any registration or tracking of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition;
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Any registration or tracking of the ownership of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition;
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Any act forbidding the possession, ownership, use, or transfer of a firearm, or firearm accessory, or ammunition by law-abiding citizens; and
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Any act ordering the confiscation of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition from law-abiding citizens.
Missouri’s law imposes a “duty” on “the Court’s and law enforcement agencies of this State to protect the rights of law-abiding citizens . . . from the infringements defined” in the Act. The Act further mandated that “[n]o entity or person, including any public officers or employee of this state or any political subdivision of this state, shall have the authority to enforce or attempt to enforce” a federal law that “infringes on the right to keep and bear arms.” The Act further provided that private citizens may sue to enforce the Act. The Act creates a cause of action against “(a)ny political subdivision or law enforcement agency” that either (1) employs a law enforcement officer who acts knowingly to violate the provisions of the Act, or (2) knowingly employs an individual acting or who previously acted as an official, agent, employee, or deputy of the government of the United States, or otherwise acted under the color of federal law within the borders of this state, who knowingly enforced, attempted to enforce, or given material aid and support for the enforcement of the infringements. The Act provides that each violation of the Act is punishable by a $50,000 penalty and prevailing parties other than the State or political subdivision of the State may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs.
The Eighth Circuit initially found that the United States (represented by the Department of Justice) had standing to sue, finding that the United States presented evidence that the Act impaired legally protected interests because state officials withdrew resources and manpower that further the enforcement of federal law. The Court then noted that Missouri “does not seriously contest” the principle that the U.S. Constitution, under the Supremacy Clause, is the supreme law of the land, and that a state may not pass any laws that are “repugnant to a law of the United States.”
Missouri contended, nevertheless, that the Act is constitutional because the State may constitutionally withdraw the authority of state officials to enforce federal law. While Missouri has the power to withhold state assistance, “the means it uses to achieve its ends must be consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” Missouri’s assertion that federal laws regulating firearms are “invalid to this State” is inconsistent with both.
The Court, having ruled that the portions of the Act that purported to invalidate federal law were unconstitutional, proceeded to an analysis of whether that portion could be severable from the remainder of the Act. The Court noted that under Missouri law, a statute is not severable if “the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one.” The Court concluded that the statute is not severable because the entire Act is founded on the invalidity of federal law.
MISSOURI SUPREME COURT RULES THAT GUILTY PLEA TO SEXUAL OFFENSES PREVENTS REMOVAL FROM SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY EVEN THOUGH THE CRIMINAL RECORD OF THE PLEA IS SEALED.
John Doe v. Eric T. Olson et al., SC100296 (Mo. banc, August 13, 2024).
John Doe in 1997 pleaded guilty to deviate sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the first degree. The court suspended Doe’s sentence and placed him on probation for five years, and Doe registered as a sex offender pursuant to Missouri’s Sex Offender Registry Act (MO-SORA).
In 2002, Doe completed his probation requirements and the circuit court sealed those criminal case records pursuant to § 610.105, RSMo, which closed his official case records because imposition of sentence was suspended and the case was finally terminated. Doe, however, has remained on the sex offender registry since his guilty plea.
After Doe’s guilty plea, the legislature amended MO-SORA several times, including to:
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Allow members of the public to request names, addresses, and crimes for registrants;
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Require individuals who have registered federally to register in Missouri;
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Publish registry information on the internet;
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Increase the information listed about registrants;
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Require in-person reporting of changes to name, residence, employment status, and student status;
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Direct registrants to report in person to disclose changes to online identifiers such as email address and internet communication names;
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Require registrants provide a DNA sample;
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Reclassify crimes into Tier I, II and III offenses;
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Allow removal from the registry for some Tier I and II registrants; and
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Require Tier II registrants to report in person every 90 days and be photographed.
In addition, Congress enacted the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act in 2006 which places registrants into one of three categories based on the seriousness of their offenses. Doe’s offenses fell into Tier II. The federal Sex Offender Registration Act allows Tier II offenders to seek removal from the federal registry after 25 years.
Doe in 2022 filed suit in St. Louis County Circuit Court against the Missouri State Highway Patrol Superintendent and the St. Louis County Sheriff, seeking declaratory injunctive relief and removal from the registry. Doe claimed the amendments to MO-SORA after his plea required him to disclose information from his sealed record, which infringes on his rights to privacy and substantive due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. Doe also claimed that the amendments under MO-SORA were a punitive ex post facto law in violation of the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions. The circuit court denied Doe’s claims.
In a unanimous opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that because no fundamental right is implicated, the registry is rationally related to a legitimate state interest and the registry is civil in nature.
Doe argued before the Supreme Court that he has a fundamental right to privacy in information that MO-SORA requires him to disclose, because the records relating to his criminal case were sealed by the circuit court pursuant to § 610.105. The Court noted that it had addressed a due process challenge to the registry in a previous case, Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. banc 2006). While the Court has generally acknowledged that “the right to privacy is fundamental” it ultimately found that the petitioning sex offenders, whose records had not been sealed, had no fundamental right to privacy in information already in the public domain. Here, however, Doe argued that unlike the sex offenders in Phillips, his record was actually sealed and, because § 610.105 seals the records of his convictions, he has a fundamental privacy interest in the information in the records.
The Court, however, noted that Doe had admitted his guilt in open court, and the information contained in the record was public for five years prior to being sealed. Sealing the record does not prevent any information related to the convictions from remaining in the public domain. “The circuit court sealing the record does not “nullify the historical fact that … [Doe] pleaded guilty to a felony.”
Thus, Doe had no fundamental right to privacy in the information contained in the sealed records. The Court further explained that because Doe failed to show a fundamental right was implicated, MO-SORA will withstand scrutiny so long as it is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” The Court pointed out that it had previously found MO-SORA is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, holding the State “has a legitimate interest in disseminating public information in the interest of safety and law enforcement efforts” and the safety of children. “MO-SORA is rationally related to the interest of disseminating information because notification makes ‘convictions accessible so members of the public can take the precautions they deem necessary before dealing with the registrant.’” While the current requirements of MO-SORA may result in the inclusion of offenders who may be unlikely to reoffend, MO-SORA is still reasonably related to the interest in protecting the public.
The Court also rejected the claim that MO-SORA violates the constitutional provision on ex post facto laws. After analyzing the law, the Court found that Doe has not clearly and undoubtedly demonstrated that MO-SORA violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws and that it is reasonable in light of its non-punitive objectives.
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT INITIATIVE PETITION SEEKING TO AMEND MISSOURI CONSTITUTION TO ESTABLISH ABORTION RIGHTS IS PROPER.
Mary Elizabeth Anne Coleman, et al. v. John R. Ashcroft, 696 S.W.3d 347 (Mo. banc 2024).
In a 4-3 decision, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the propriety of an initiative petition to amend the state constitution to provide for abortion rights. Judge Wilson wrote the decision and Chief Justice Russell and Judges Ransom and Powell concurred (although Powell concurred in a separate opinion). Judge Broniec wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Judges Fischer and Gooch.
In March 2023, Dr. Anna Fitz-James submitted to the Secretary of State, as required by § 116.332.1, a sample petition sheet for a proposed constitutional amendment which was intended to institute a fundamental right to reproductive freedom including abortion care. At this point, § 116.332.1 requires both the Attorney General and the Secretary to independently assess the form of the petition to ensure it complies with all applicable requirements. The Attorney General approved the form of the proposed petition and notified the Secretary. The Secretary was to review the public comments received and the Attorney General’s statements as to form and make a final decision as to the approval or rejection of the form of the petition. The Secretary did so, approving the form of the petition and notifying Fitz-James of this “final decision.”
Once the form was approved, the Secretary prepared a summary of the measure pursuant to § 116.334.1, and the Auditor prepared a fiscal note and fiscal note summary pursuant to § 116.175.2. Together the Secretary’s summary of the measure and the Auditor’s fiscal note summary constituted the official ballot title for the measure under § 116.180. These were then sent to the Attorney General for approval as to form under § 116.334.1 and 116.175.4. The Attorney General, however, refused to approve the form of the Auditor’s fiscal note summary which prevented the Secretary from certifying the official ballot for the initial petition and delayed proponents circulating the petition for signatures.
In May 2023, Fitz-James filed a petition in Cole County Circuit Court to compel the Attorney General to approve the fiscal note summary. The circuit court issued a writ directing the Attorney General to do so and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.[i] In July 2023, after the Attorney General approved the legal content of the fiscal note summary, the Secretary certified that summary and his summary statement as the official ballot title for the initiative. However, that same day, Fitz-James filed suit under § 116.190 claiming the Secretary’s summary was insufficient and unfair. On September 25, 2023, the circuit court entered judgment for Fitz-James finding that the summary statement was insufficient and unfair and redrafted the summary to comply with § 116.334.1. The Court of Appeals, Western District, agreed, and certified a summary statement varying slightly from that certified by the circuit court.
Proponents of the petition then began circulating the initiative for signatures, and on May 3, 2024 they filed the signed petition with the Secretary of State, who reviewed and ultimately validated a sufficient number of signatures in a sufficient number of congressional districts to meet the requirements of putting the proposed amendment on the ballot. Accordingly, on August 13, the Secretary of State issued a certificate that the petition was sufficient.
On August 22, opponents of the initiative filed the present action in Cole County Circuit Court, claiming (1) the petition failed to include every constitutional provision and statute that may be altered, validated or otherwise limited or affected should the voters approve the amendment; (2) that the proposed amendment violates the single subject requirement of Article III, Section 50 and Article XII, Section 2(b) of the Missouri Constitution; and (3) § 116.200.1 is unconstitutional because it does not give them adequate time to challenge the Secretary certification of putting the amendment on the November ballot. The circuit court agreed with the opponents’ argument that the petition failed to include the laws and regulations that would be invalidated and ordered that the proposed Amendment be removed from the November ballot, but stayed the effect of the judgment to allow for appeal. The Supreme Court issued its order, reversing the judgment of the circuit court, on September 10, ordering Amendment 3 to be placed on the November ballot.
In its opinion, the Court stated: “This case is not about abortion. It concerns only what information the constitution requires proponents to include on any initiative petition. It is about form and procedure, not substance.” The Court explained that the Attorney General approved the form of the Amendment 3 petition 17 months earlier, in March 2023, and that “if there was a defect in the form of the petition, it is fair to assume the State’s Chief Legal Officer would have identified it and notified the Secretary of State.” The Court noted that he did not. Then, pursuant to § 116.33.4, the Secretary of State conducted an independent analysis of the form of the petition and made the “final decision” that it was in proper form. The Court observed: “Again, if there was a defect, it is fair to assume the one constitutional officer statutorily designated to supervise every initiative petition from start to finish would have identified it. He did not.”
The Court explained that the reason these decisions by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State are so important is that they occur at the beginning of the process, when an error in form can be corrected with a minimum of disruption to the citizens’ constitutional power of initiative petition. The Court continued: “Perhaps most important if (as here) the claimed defect is that the petition omits required information essential for Missourians to have before deciding whether to sign the petition in the first instance, a correction at the beginning of the process – before signatures are gathered – protects that interest.” One that occurs 17 months later, after hundreds of thousands have signed the petition and those signatures have been verified and counted, and the measure has been certified for the ballot, does not.
The opponents of the petition claimed that under Article III, Section 50 of the Missouri Constitution and § 116.050.2(2), the proponents of the petition were required to include in the petition every constitutional provision and every statute that may be invalidated, limited or otherwise impacted if voters approve Amendment 3. The Court found, however, that Section 116.050.2(2) imposes no such requirement. Even if it did, nothing in Article III, Section 50 of the Missouri Constitution imposes such a requirement, and restrictions on the people’s power of initiative must be found in the Constitution. They cannot be imposed by the general assembly.
Thus, the question is only what the constitution requires. The Court noted that previously, in Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. banc 1981), the Court held that Article III, Section 50 requires a petition proposing a constitutional amendment to identify those existing sections of the Constitution, that are utterly inconsistent and irreconcilable with the proposed amendment. The Court further observed “this Court has never held that Article III, Section 50 requires a petition proposing a constitutional amendment to identify all statutes that might later be declared invalid in whole or in part if the constitutional amendment is approved by the voters” (emphasis original). The Court found that there is no basis in the text of the Constitution for requiring a constitutional amendment to identify all statutes that might be affected, and it would impose burdensome requirements with which drafters of initiative petitions cannot reasonably comply.
The Court held that, “Because Amendment 3 does not purport to repeal any existing constitutional provision and is not so utterly and completely inconsistent with any existing constitutional article or section as to constitute a direct conflict or irreconcilable repugnance, Opponents’ first challenge fails.”
The Court also rejected the opponents’ claim that the proposed amendment violated the single subject requirement of Article III, Section 50 and Article XIII, Section 2(b) of the Constitution. The Court explained that the constitutional “single subject” requirement prohibits only proposed constitutional amendments that have multiple unrelated provisions. “Instead, they must either all relate to some single, reasonably specific subject or ‘be properly connected therewith.’” Here, the proposed amendment identifies its purpose as protecting reproductive freedom and all its provisions easily bear a sufficient relationship to that subject – or properly connected to it – to satisfy Article III, Section 50 and Article XIII, Section 2(b).
The Court also rejected the opponents’ third claim, that § 116.200.1 is unconstitutional because time constraints unfairly limits a citizen’s right to challenge the Secretary of State’s certification that an initiative is sufficient to be placed on the ballot. However, here the circuit court and the Supreme Court were able to fully analyze and finally address opponents’ first two claims notwithstanding the very demanding timetable. For that reason, opponents’ third claim was denied as moot.
In Judge Broniec’s dissenting opinion, in which she was joined by Judges Fischer and Gooch, she disagreed with the majority’s opinion, arguing that Amendment 3 failed to comply with Chapter 116 by not including all statutory and constitutional provisions it would repeal if approved by the voters.
[i] This case, State ex rel. Fitz-James v. Bailey, 670 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. banc 2023), was discussed in the Fall 2023 issue of the St. Louis Bar Journal.