National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Missouri State Conference vs. Governor Mike Kehoe, et al., No. SC101541 (Mo. banc May 27, 2026).
Summary:
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s declaratory judgment that the Missouri governor has constitutional authority to call an extraordinary session to address issues relating to, first, establishing new congressional districts and, second, changing the initiative petition process.
The NAACP and two individuals (collectively “NAACP”) sued seeking a declaration that the governor’s proclamation did not meet the requirements of article IV, section 9 of the Missouri Constitution, as the circumstances did not constitute an “extraordinary occasion.” Further, they sought to enjoin the session and, ultimately, implementation of the measures enacted there. Following a bench trial, a Cole County circuit court judge found that constitutional authority existed to call the session, and that the question was political in nature, properly decidable by the governor.
In affirming the circuit court opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court held that article IV, section 9 gave the governor discretion to determine whether an extraordinary occasion exists, warranting calling an extraordinary session.
Facts:
In August 2025, the governor issued a proclamation calling for the Second Extraordinary Session of the 103rd Missouri General Assembly, articulating an “extraordinary occasion” requiring two actions: establishing new congressional districts and changing the initiative petition process. Among the stated reasons for this action were that the General Assembly had adjourned its regular legislative session without having enacted new congressional district boundaries; that Missouri’s current congressional map could be vulnerable to a legal challenge under the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment; that “our congressional delegation should reflect the values of Missourians;” that legislation to establish new congressional districts could not be accomplished in the 2016 Regular Session; and that “swift and efficient resolution of the matter is necessary to prepare for the upcoming election cycle and to provide certainty for voters.”
As to the initiative process, the governor proclaimed that “a fair and transparent initiative process is essential for the citizens of Missouri to propose and enact laws;” that the current initiative process “may be vulnerable to foreign and out-of-state influence;” and that “certain ballot initiatives can be confusing to voters and lead to unintended consequences.”
The General Assembly then met and passed House Bill 1 and House Joint Resolution 3, adopting a new congressional district map and proposing a constitutional amendment altering the initiative petition process.
NAACP filed suit on the day the extraordinary session was to convene, seeking a declaration that the governor’s proclamation failed to state an extraordinary occasion pursuant to article IV, section 9 and requesting injunctive relief against convening the general assembly. The NAACP later amended its pleadings, requesting the court to enjoin implementation of the legislation passed during the extraordinary session which had occurred while the initial injunction request was pending.
Reasoning:
In affirming that the governor had constitutional authority to call the extraordinary session and that the issue raised by the NAACP was a political question that should be determined by the governor, the Supreme Court found that neither constitutional text nor historical context impose limitation of the governor’s discretion according to an objective definition of “extraordinary.” The Court emphasized language of article IV, section 9 that the governor may give to the general assembly information as to state of the government and recommend to it such measures “as he shall deem necessary and expedient.” Further, per section 9 the governor may convene the general assembly by proclamation on “extraordinary occasions,” stating specifically each matter on which action is “deemed necessary.” Per the Court, this language instills the governor with a “great deal of discretion.”
The Supreme Court rejected the NAACP’s argument that the dictionary definition of “extraordinary” (in context “an unusual set of circumstances”) must exist before the governor may exercise the discretion to identify the measures to be considered within an extraordinary session. The NAACP further argued that the events identified in the proclamation already existed at the time of the prior session of the general assembly, so no “extraordinary occasion” existed allowing the governor to call an extraordinary session.
The Court stated that the plain meaning of “extraordinary” in the constitutional provision, from the time of its adoption (1820) through the present, is “a particular occasion, outside the regular or ordinary pattern of legislative sessions, and called by the governor to address issues he deems necessary.” (Citing “Extraordinary,” Noah Webster’s Am Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).
The Court stated that, contrary to NAACP’s contention, article IV, section 9 does not include language suggesting the governor’s discretion to call an extraordinary purpose “is limited in any way.” Citing McGivney v. Mo. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 653 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Mo. banc 2022), the Court asserted that it would not read words into a constitutional provision, and that the constitutional provision does not require the extraordinary occasion to be an unusual occasion, nor does it specify a method for determining whether an occasion is sufficiently unusual to justify such a session.
Further, to hold that an extraordinary session must be called pursuant only to events that did not exist prior to the regular session would require the Court ignore the context of the entire provision, which also empowers the governor to “inform the general assembly about the ‘state of the government’” and to suggest legislation in the context of calling an extraordinary session.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that, given the discretion afforded by article IV, section 9, the governor acted pursuant to constitutional authority when calling the Second Extraordinary Session of the 103rd Missouri General Assembly.
Healey, et al. v. State, of Missouri, et al., SC101570, SC101572 (Mo. banc May 12, 2026)
Summary:
In separate suits, two groups of residents challenged the constitutionality of the new congressional redistricting map enacted in 2025 with respect to the Kansas City, Missouri, area. The circuit court (Jackson County) consolidated the cases and considered substantial evidence regarding county and municipal splits, measures of compactness, and sundry expert and lay testimony, and concluded that the 2025 map did not violate constitutional standards.
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower court judgment, concluding that plaintiffs failed to show a clear, undoubtable violation of article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution and emphasized that statistical and historical comparisons supported the circuit court’s findings. It also found that any departures from compactness were minimal.
Facts:
After the United States census was conducted in 2022, the Missouri legislature divided the state into congressional districts as required by article III, section 45, resulting in the 2022 Map. However, in 2025 the legislature passed House Bill 1, repealing the 2022 Map and creating a redrawn congressional district map which the governor signed.
The Missouri Constitution directly addresses congressional redistricting in article II, section 45. In part, it instructs the legislature to “divide the state into districts corresponding with the number of representatives to which it is entitled, which districts shall be comprised of contiguous territory as compact and as nearly equal in population as may be.”
One group of appellants – the “Wise Appellants” – challenged districts as drawn in the 2025 Map as not being compact, not composing separate congressional districts to be of nearly equal population, and (with respect to two districts) not being contiguous. The second appellant group –– the “Healey Appellants” –– urged violation of the compactness requirement. The Missouri Republican State Committee was permitted to intervene in both cases.
As to compactness, the parties introduced recognized statistical measures to quantify compactness of the congressional districts created by the 2025 Map. Under the “Polsby-Popper” measure, experts for both sides agreed that the 2025 map was more compact state-wide than the 2022 map. The circuit court reached the same conclusion, using Maptitude mapping and redistricting software. The circuit court also found that the 2025 map outperformed the 2012 congressional map in terms of compactness. Other compactness measures supported these conclusions as well, according to the Court.
The parties also presented evidence and testimony from lay and expert witnesses related to “communities of interest” and alternative maps. Kansas City’s mayor testified to his concern with the 2025 map as dividing communities of interest in that city. While recognizing that Appellants’ policy preferences were “justifiable and understandable,” the Court determined that those preferences “have limited value” because “the court’s role is not to decide which portions of the Kansas City area are best to split to keep some ‘communities of interest’ intact while dividing others.”
Appellants also presented alternative maps at trial, which were not before nor considered by the legislature in passing the 2025 map. The circuit court concluded the maps “did little to aid the court’s evaluation of the 2025 map.”
As to contiguity and equal population requirements, the circuit court found that the Wise Appellants had put on no evidence at trial that actually supported the claims.
Reasoning:
The Court stated that its review was “limited to determining only the legality—not the prudence or popularity—of the map.” Further, the 2025 map would be upheld unless it “plainly and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution” with doubts “resolved in favor of ... constitutionality….” Compactness and numerical equality “cannot be achieved with absolute precision….”
The Supreme Court emphasized that courts “will respect the political determinations of the Missouri legislature” where the redistricted map complies with constitutional strictures. Thus, drawing maps establishing congressional districts is a “political process, involving policy decisions that are political in nature, best left to elected representatives and the citizens of this state, not judges.” While gerrymandering may “reasonably seem unjust,” it involves “political questions” beyond the scope of judicial review absent laws prohibiting such practice.
As to compactness, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Appellants introduced and relied on statistical metrics in arguing that certain districts were not compact. However, it stated that Appellants were wrong in contending that the circuit court relied solely on statistical metrics in determining compactness. Rather, the lower court considered the totality of the evidence, including historical maps, population density, county and municipal splits, and related expert testimony.
The Court further rejected Appellants’ arguments that (a) the circuit court erred by failing to conduct a district-by-district analysis in determining compactness; (b) the circuit court’s evaluation was irrelevant, noting instead that the compactness of one district directly affects the compactness of a neighboring district; (c) it was erroneous to compare the compactness metrics of the 2025 map with the districts in prior congressional maps, because the constitutional requirements for redistricting implicitly permit consideration of the historical boundary lines of prior redistricting maps (citing Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 28 (Mo. banc 2012)); (d) the circuit court failed to consider “communities of interest” evidence, when in fact it did; (e) failing to determine whether the challenged districts’ departures from compactness were minimal and practical deviations, stating that the Appellants’ failure to demonstrate any departures from compactness obviated the need to make any such determination; and rejecting of
Appellants’ arguments.
As to contiguity and equal protection requirements, as presaged above the Supreme Court disagreed with the contention that the circuit court misapplied the law in finding that no evidence had been presented by the Wise Appellants at trial to support their position on those issues. The Court relied on the presumption that the map was constitutional absent clear and undoubted proof that the map contravenes the constitution, with doubts resolved in favor of constitutionality.
Conclusion:
The Healey and Wise Appellants failed to show that the 2025 map clearly and undoubtedly violates the requirements of article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution, and affirmed the lower court’s judgment defeating Appellants’ claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
Jake Maggard, et al. vs. State of Missouri, et al., SC 101581 (Mo. banc May 12, 2026)
Summary:
The Missouri Supreme Court held that filing a referendum petition does not automatically suspend a legislative act under the Missouri Constitution. The petitioners had not yet had supporting signatures verified and certified by the Missouri Secretary of State; the Supreme Court stated that suspension occurs only if the petition is determined to be legal, sufficient, and timely.
Plaintiffs had submitted such a petition challenging the Missouri General Assembly’s redrawing of congressional districts (HB 1) despite no census certification, and differing materially from the 2002 map adopted following the national consensus conducted that year. Plaintiffs contended principally that HB 1 was suspended until voters could decide on it by virtue of the referendum petition’s filing on December 9, 2025.
Following a bench trial, the circuit court (Cole County) dismissed the referendum petition for lack of ripeness and standing, per the political question doctrine and due to the existence of a sufficient statutory remedy. It further declared that HB 1 was not automatically suspended by virtue of the filing of the referendum petition and that the relevant statutes (art. III, sections 49, 52(a) and 52(b)) were not unconstitutional as applied.
Facts:
HB 1 was enacted by the General Assembly in September 2025, codified as sections 128.345, 128.346, 128.348 and 128.471 through 128.479, and effective December 11, 2025. It repealed congressional districts established in 2022 and established new districts notwithstanding that there had been no certification of a new census to the governor.
Appellants were two Missouri voters who each would reside in a new congressional district under HB 1. Their single-count petition sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that HB 1 was automatically suspended under the Missouri Constitution upon filing of the referendum petition. They further alleged that, to the extent that sections 116.130 or 116.150 permit the secretary of state to delay suspension of a referred law until issuance of a certificate of sufficiency, they conflict with article III, sections 49, 52(a) and (b) and hence are unconstitutional. They also sought an injunction prevention establishment of HB 1’s congressional map until voters approved it through the referendum process.
The circuit court held a bench trial on stipulated evidence. It entered judgment against Appellants, dismissing their petition for lack of standing and, alternatively, for lack of ripeness; for presenting a nonjusticiable political question; and for seeking a declaratory judgment when an adequate statutory remedy exists. It alternatively reached the merits and declared that HB 1 was not automatically suspended as of December 9, when the referendum petition was filed.
Reasoning:
The Missouri Supreme Court noted that Appellants did not challenge the secretary of state’s refusal to certify a referendum, not that did the certification process is statutorily delegated to the secretary of state. The Appellants further agreed that they did not seek to interfere with that process. Instead, Appellants asserted that the case involved a single, narrow, purely legal issue: what is the status of HB 1 in the meantime, i.e., while the supporting signatures are being verified.
The Court stated that it “need look no further” than the plain language of article III, sections 49, 52(a) and 52(b).” According to the Court, nothing in those sections provides that the filing of a referendum petition alone automatically suspends the act of the General Assembly at issue. And nowhere do they use the words “suspend,” “suspension,” or the like. Further, it was stipulated that the secretary had not issued a certificate of sufficiency as to the referendum petition and that the statutory deadline for certificate issuance had not passed.
Appellants argued that article III, section 52(b) supports their automatic suspension position. That section provides that “Any measure referred to the people shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes case thereon, and not otherwise.” The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that under the plain language of sections 52(a) and (b) no measure is referred to the people until the signature requirement is satisfied. “While article III, section 52(b) addresses when ‘any measure’ takes effect after having been referred to the people, it does not provide the mere filing of a referendum petition automatically suspends the act of the General Assembly at issue.”
Per the Court, Appellants did not show that the secretary could have determined, or did determine, compliance with the signature requirement by December 9, when the referendum petition was filed. To the contrary, the referendum petition organizer had written that “[A]cceptance of this referendum and issuance of this receipt does not constitute a determination by the [s]ecretary [ ] that the petition was submitted in accordance with Chapter 116 RSMo.”
The Supreme Court stated that, “[O]nly when the chapter 116 certification process is final (i.e., when the secretary has issued a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency under section 116.150 and the judicial review of that certificate the General Assembly authorized in section 116.200 is complete) can it be determined whether the referendum petition was “legal, sufficient, and timely” (or not) when it was filed on December 9.” Further, “[I]f the December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be insufficient, HB 1 became the law on December 11 under article III, section 29 because no ‘legal, sufficient, and timely’ referendum petition was filed before expiration of the 90-day period in article III, section 52(a).” (Citing State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman, 250 S.W.2d 701, 703, 705-07 (Mo. banc 1952).)
In contrast, “[I]f, however, the December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be sufficient, article III, section 52(b) applies. In that case, because a legal, sufficient, and timely referendum petition was filed on December 9—before HB 1 went into effect on December 11—HB 1 did not take effect on December 11, HB 1 was ‘referred to the people’ as of December 9, and HB 1 ‘shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 52(b).’”
The Court rejected Appellants’ heavy reliance on Kemper v. Carter, 165 S.W. 773, 779 (Mo. banc 1914), which held that the filing of a legal, sufficient and timely referendum petition suspends any act of the General Assembly at issue in the petition. “This case before the Court here is distinguishable, because Kemper does not resolve the legal issue presented here, because it involved an admittedly sufficient [referendum] petition.”
Thus, the Court reasoned, because the certification process is ongoing and not finally determined, “it is impossible to say as of this opinion whether the December 9 referendum filing petition was ‘legal, sufficient and timely’” and which of the above results apply.
Conclusion:
Having found no conflict, on the facts of the case, between article III, sections 49, 52(a), and 52(b) and sections 116.130 and 116.150 as to Appellants’ argument the December 9 referendum petition filing automatically suspended HB 1, the Court rejected Appellants’ as-applied challenge to the constitutional validity of sections 116.130 and 116.150 and affirmed the decision below.
Cox, et al. v. Grady Hotel Investments, LLC, et al., SC101131 (Mo. banc April 21, 2026)
Summary:
This case centered on a dispute concerning realty tax assessment valuation, and the standing of the Park Hill School District and Platte County Assessor to challenge the assessment.
Grady Hotel Investments, LLC purchased improvements (including a Marriot hotel) to land owned by the City of Kansas City, but not the land itself, which continued to be owned by the City. In 2016, the Platte County assessor valued the improvements at $11.22 million. This assessed amount was subsequently upped to $13.4 million by the Platte County Board of Equalization.
That assessment was administratively appealed, and the full State Tax Commission (STC) ultimately valued the improvements at $0 (i.e., the difference between economic rent and the contract rent for use and occupancy of the premises) on the basis that the interest of Grady was in the nature of a leasehold. The matter proceeded to the Circuit Court of Platte County, which found that Grady owned (as opposed to leased) the improvements. As such, the STC’s leasehold valuation method did not apply. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded the case for a new valuation.
Upon remand, the STC assessed the property at more than $6 million. This led to an appeal by the Assessor and the School District, who raised constitutional issues as to the valuation statute, section 137.115.1. The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately held that the School District’s pecuniary interest did not create standing to challenge another party’s property valuation. The Assessor also lacked standing as to certain claims (due process and special privilege provisions) but did have standing to challenge the statute under other provisions (tax exemption and uniformity). However, as to the latter two, the Court held that the statute did not create an unconstitutional tax exemption, nor did it violate the uniformity clause.
Facts:
Grady Hotel Investments, LLC, purchased the Marriot Hotel in 2015 from Host Hotels & Resorts, L.P., for $8.5 million. The land, which lies within boundaries of the Kansas City International Airport, remains titled as property of the City of Kansas City (“City”). Grady purchased a possessory interest to the improvements on that parcel, such that Grady owns the hotel building situated on airport property, but not the land itself. The City, a political subdivision of the state, is exempt from paying property taxes. Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 6. Grady, however, is required to pay property taxes on the property improvements, i.e. the hotel building. Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 4(b); art. X, sec. 4(c).
In the 2016 tax year, Assessor valued the hotel at $11,222,000, a determination that Grady appealed to the Platte County Board of Equalization. The Board increased the value of the hotel to $13,447,000. Grady appealed the Board’s decision to the State Tax Commission (“STC”). An STC hearing officer set aside the Board’s evaluation and set the valuation at $7.3 million. The hearing officer purported to apply section 137.115.1 by taking the price of the sale of the improvements—$8.5 million—less the cost paid toward new construction of the improvements—$1.2 million. Grady appealed that decision to the full STC, which determined that Grady held a leasehold interest in the hotel. As such, it valued the property as the difference between economic rent and the contract rent for use and occupancy of the premises. As a result, the STC held the property’s value to be $0.
The Assessor appealed the STC’s decision to the Platte County Circuit Court, and the School District was permitted to intervene. The circuit court determined that STC’s $0 valuation was arbitrary, capricious and unsupported by law, and that its use of a leasehold-based valuation was inappropriate because Grady owned (did not merely lease) the improvements. The Court of Appeals agreed and remanded the case back to the STC. An STC hearing officer’s methodology subtracted the value of personal property ($1,160,495) and the cost of new construction and improvements ($1.2 million) from the purchase price ($8.5 million) for a valuation of $6,139,505. The full STC affirmed.
Back to the circuit court went the parties, with the Assessor (joined by the School District) challenging the constitutional validity of section 137.115.1.: (a) as being void for vagueness, (b) giving Grady an unconstitutional tax exemption, (c) violating the uniformity provision, and (d) as granting an irrevocable special privilege. The circuit court affirmed the STC’s decision. The matter proceeded to the Missouri Supreme Court due to the question of the constitutionality of section 137.115.1.
Reasoning:
Noting that standing is a prerequisite to the Court’s authority to address substantive issues, the Supreme Court assessed (1) whether appellants respectively had protectable interests at stake, and (2) whether the controversy was ripe for judicial determination.
As to the School District, the Court noted that under Missouri law individual plaintiffs – be they corporations, individuals, or school districts – lack standing to challenge other taxpayers’ property tax assessments because they are not personally injured by others’ assessment calculations. (Citing State ex rel. Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. McBeth, 322 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Mo. banc 2010)). McBeth, and the Supreme Court here, drew a distinction between a School District bringing a declaratory judgment, i.e., seeking a declaration of its own rights, and intervening in the appeal of another’s tax assessment. Thus, the School Board’s argument that it had standing because its “unique economic interest” derives funding from property taxes was unavailing.
As to the Assessor, its sundry arguments for standing partially failed. He argued that the failure of section 137.115.1 to define the term “new construction and improvements” renders it void for vagueness under the Missouri due process clause (art.1, sect. 10). The latter states that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” However, the Court noted that political subdivisions do not enjoy the same rights as Missouri citizens, and that “creatures of the state,” such as assessors (and school districts) are not “persons” within the protections of the due process clause and cannot charge the state with violations of due process.
The Assessor further urged that section 137.115.1 violates art. I, sect. 13 of the Missouri Constitution. Section 13, which provides “no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.” Assessor claimed that because, under the statute, Grady is allowed to deduct the cost of new construction and improvements from the value of the hotel, the provision gives him an irrevocable special privilege that does not apply to similar properties not within airport boundaries.
Again, however, the Court emphasized that “political actors do not enjoy the same constitutional protections as Missouri citizens.” Additionally, “[Both] the retrospective law clause and the special privilege and immunity clause are in article I, section 13 of our citizen bill of rights. This bill of rights was established to protect citizens, not state or political actors. Mo. Mun. League v. State, 489 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Mo. banc 2016).”
Assessor also advanced arguments under Article X of the Missouri Constitution. The Court found that Assessor had standing to bring these claims. “While the Assessor’s duties are statutory, not constitutional, this Court has recognized standing when an Assessor challenges a statute affecting his duties. See Johnson v. Springfield Solar LLC, 648 S.W.3d 101 (Mo. banc 2022).”
The Assessor challenged section 137.115.1 under article X, asserting it creates a tax exemption because Grady will be able to continually deduct new construction and improvements from the value, which will eventually reach $0. Assessor also contends section 137.115.1 treats the hotel differently than like properties near it and, as such, violates the uniformity clause. However, the Court found that Section 137.115.1 does not lead to a tax exemption. A tax exemption is “freedom from a duty, liability, or other requirement; an exception or an amount allowed as a deduction from adjusted gross income, used to determine taxable income.” Airport Tech Partners v. State, 462 S.W.3d 740, 743 n.3 (Mo. banc 2015). Thus, section 137.115.1 does not grant Grady freedom from tax liability.
Moreover, Article X, section 6 states, “All laws exempting from taxation property other than the property enumerated in this article, shall be void.” As such, “[T]he constitution sets out the universe of property exempt from taxation. In doing so, it clearly expresses the people’s intent that only a limited number of properties may be exempted from taxation.” Springfield Solar, 648 S.W.3d at 103-04.
Finally, Assessor argued that section 137.115.1 violates the uniformity clause in article X, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution, contending the hotel is not being taxed uniformly as similar properties in the same subclass. Article X, section 3 states, in relevant part, that taxes “shall be uniform upon the same class or subclass of subjects.” The uniformity clause requires taxes to be: “(1) uniform; (2) upon the same class or subclass of subjects; (3) within the territorial limits; (4) of the authority levying the tax.” Armstrong-Trotwood v. State Tax Comm’n, 516 S.W.3d 830, 835-36 (Mo. banc 2017). Article X, section 3 also provides that, “the methods of determining the value of property for taxation shall be fixed by law.”
Noting that, while the subject clause requires the tax rate for the same subclass of property to be uniform, it does not require property values and valuation methods to be uniform. As such, the uniformity clause does not apply to valuations or impose obligations on authorities responsible for valuing or assessing property.
Thus, while finding that the Assessor had standing to assert his article X claims, section 137.115.1 does not create an unconstitutional tax exemption under article X, section 6, nor does it violate the uniformity clause of article X, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, for the reasons stated.
Wilkinson v. Farmers Holding Companies, SC101268 (Mo. banc April 21, 2026)
Summary:
This case centered on whether summary judgement was appropriately granted pursuant to applicable Missouri requirements for summary judgment practice.
Plaintiff sent a certified letter to his former employer requesting a service letter after his employment was terminated. When the employer did not respond, Plaintiff sued, alleged a violation of section 290.140 for failing to provide the service letter. His additional claim for disability discrimination was dismissed in federal court, and his state claim was remanded to state court.
Summary judgment was granted by the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County on the basis that the service letter and lawsuit named the incorrect corporate entity. Plaintiff failed in various respects to properly respond to the summary judgment motion in the manner required by Rule 74.04(c)(2). The court found no genuine issues of material fact after deeming the factual statements admitted.
The Missouri Supreme Court used the occasion to reiterate the requirements for summary judgment practice, stating that summary judgement is not an “extreme or drastic remedy.” There being a failure to preserve the record or make arguments demonstrating errors by the circuit could, summary judgment was affirmed.
Facts:
Plaintiff Lucas Wilkinson worked as a wet plant foreman at Capital Sand (the d/b/a of the named Defendant) until his employment was terminated in January 2022. In April 2022, Wilkinson sent a certified letter to “Farmer Holding Co.” requesting a service letter per section 290.140. After receiving no response, Wilkinson sued Farmers, alleging violation of that section.
Without answering or advancing affirmative defenses, Farmers moved for summary judgment on the basis that Wilkinson had not sent the service letter to or sued his actual employer, which Defendant contended to be Capital Sand Proppants, LLC. Wilkinson had received his W-2’s from that entity.
Reasoning:
The Supreme Court first rejected Wilkinson’s characterization of summary judgement as an “extreme and drastic remedy.” It repeated language from ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am Marine Supply Co., 854 S.W. 2d 371, 377-78 (Mo. banc 1993): “To the extent that trial and appellate courts are of the impression that the ‘slightest doubt’ standard defeats summary judgment when any doubt exists, no matter how unreasonable, the standard [h]as been misapplied and is now abandoned.”
Wilkinson argued that “numerous genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute.” The Court addressed this by quoting the requirements of Rule 74.04(c)(2) concerning summary judgment responses, including that a response must “set forth each statement of fact in its original paragraph number and immediately thereafter admit or deny each of movant’s factual statements” and requiring the response to “support each denial with specific references to the discovery, exhibits or affidavits that demonstrate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Instead, Wilkinson filed a document entitled “Answer and Counter Affidavit,” setting out newly numbered paragraphs referencing several of Farmers’ individual statements of fact – without repeating those facts as required – and either admitted or denied them in bulk. The purported denials made no specific reference to supporting materials. This violated Rule 74.04(c)(2)’s requirement that “[A] denial may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleading.” The Court also noted that the same subsection provides that failure to comply with the Rule “with respect to any numbered paragraph in movant’s statement is an admission of truth of that numbered paragraph.” Thus, Wilkson’s non-compliance with the Rule resulted in admission of the truth of each of Farmers’ statements of material fact.
Nor did Wilkinson set forth further additional material facts that remained in dispute, as permitted by Rule 74.04(c)(1). Various bare allegations made by Wilkinson were not in the prescribed form and no references were made to supporting materials in the record, as required.
Thus, Wilkinson failed to establish any issue of genuine material fact that remained in issue, such that summary judgment was appropriate.
The Court added: “This is not to say the circuit court had to enter summary judgement in Farmers’ favor based on the inappropriate summary judgment response.” It referenced the language of Rule 74.04.(c)(6) that summary judgment shall be entered …when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” However, Wilkinson did not argue the point in his opening brief that (nor did he do so at the circuit court level) that, even absent a genuine material fact dispute, summary judgement was not available under the law. And indeed Wilkinson apparently recognized this prospect, filing a reply brief raising the new argument that summary judgement was precluded as a matter of law, i.e., that Farmers failed to comply with Rule 55.08 by failing to file an answer asserting, as an affirmative defense, Wilkinson’s noncompliance with section 290.140.
The Court made short work of dispensing with this belated argument, noting that [“[T]his Court’s appellate rules preclude new issues from being raised in a reply brief.” Rule 84.04(d)(1)(A). And, under Rule 84.13(a), “[A]llegations of error not briefed or not properly briefed shall not be considered in any civil appeal [.]”
It also rejected the notion that the “de novo” standard of review provided Wilkinson with the opportunity to raise the “matter of law” argument for the first time on appeal, where it was not raised or preserved. “Wilkinson misunderstands de novo review. ‘[T]his Court reviews the circuit court’s grant of summary judgement de novo. But this standard of review does not alter that appellants always bear the burden of establishing error whatever the standard of review. City of De Soto v. Parson, 625 S.W.3d 412, 416 n. 3 (Mo. banc 2021).” Also, “[a] contrary rule would require this Court to become an advocate for Wilkinson by raising sua sponte arguments he did not raise in the circuit court or on appeal and to which Farmers had no opportunity to respond…It follows that Wilkinson failed to properly preserve the argument he raises for the first time in his reply brief.”
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that it court did not err in entering summary judgment for Farmers.
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